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TAX INTERPRETATION: LESSONS FROM
THE REINCORPORATION CASES
THOmAS A. ROBINSON 1

During the last half-century, courts have used flexible methods of interpretation to dose various tax loopholes through which shareholders have
attempted to bailout corporate earnings and profits at capital gains rates.
Some of these methods, such as substance-over-form, step-transactions and
business purpose, are now widely used to interpret other parts of the Internal
Revenue Code. 2 Though Congress has long since legislatively dosed most of
the original bailout loopholes, one, the reincorporation device, remains conspicuously open. 3 Through this device shareholders, while keeping operating
assets in corporate solution, seek the favorable tax treatment the Code offers
to liquidating corporations. In reaction, some courts have begun to use a
troublesome new method of tax interpretation: the functionally unrelated test.
Finding certain steps in a transaction independently fruitful, and functionally
unrelated to other steps, these courts reclassify the transaction into a less
favorable tax category and thereby deny liquidation treatment to the reincorporating shareholders.
This article will argue that even the desirable goal of stopping the reincorporation device does not justify using such flexible methods of statutory
interpretation as the functionally unrelated test. Long after the reincorporation
loophole is dosed by appropriate legislation, activist courts will be tempted to
use the functionally unrelated test to alter the Code's application to other tax
transactions where the result mandated by the legislative language seems inappropriate. Because of the special importance of statutory language in a
self-assessing tax system, flexible methods of judicial interpretation should be
tightly controlled. When the codified language leads to a wrong result, the
language should be amended, rather than altered by judicial interpretation.
Initially, this article describes the reincorporation device and traces
developments leading to the functionally unrelated test. Next, it examines the
1. B.S., Idaho, 1966; B.Litt., Oxford University, 1975; J.D., U.C.L.A., 1969. Associate
Professor of Law, University of Arkansas (Fayetteville). Visiting Associate Professor of Law,
University of Miami, 1982. This article was facilitated by a research grant made available by
the University of Arkansas School of Law.
2. See B. Birrnax, I FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs (1981)
4.3.5.
See also Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal Revenue

Code, 21 How. L.J. 693 (1978).
3. "Reincorporations have come to the fore in recent years as tax-avoidance devices of
significant potentialities...." B. BinTrxR & J. EusTica, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (1979, with Cure. Supp. No. 4) f 3.20.
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functionally unrelated test as a method of tax interpretation. Finally, the
article argues that using the functionally unrelated test to stop the reincorporation device is unjustified.
The ReincorporationDevice
The tax benefits of reincorporation are best explained by example. The
first step in a classic reincorporation scheme is essentially a complete liquidation. 4 The corporation distributes its operating assets and excess cash to its
shareholders in return for their stock. Under section 336(a), the corporation
recognizes no gain or loss on the exchange 5 and its earnings and profits account
essentially dissolves. 6 The corporation's shareholders are required to recognize
any gain or loss they realize, but are afforded exchange treatment that
characterizes the gain or loss as a capital gain or loss. 7 Consequently, the shareholders take a fair market value basis in the assets received from the liquidating
corporation. 8
At this juncture in a normal liquidation, shareholders would pocket the
excess cash and either sell the remaining assets or continue to use them in a
non-corporate business.9 It is the subsequent steps that differentiate a reincorporation from an ordinary corporate liquidation. The reincorporating
shareholders contribute the operating assets to a new corporation in return
for its stock.10 If the liquidation of the old corporation is sufficiently divorced
from this later reincorporation, the shareholders will have successfully withdrawn the excess cash at capital gains rates while returning the operating
assets to corporate solution with a stepped-up basis."
4. See Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35, 38 (4th Cir. 1965) ("If, when the individual petitioners dissolved Pridemark, they had permanently abandoned the selling of
prefabricated homes it would have been clear that there had been a "complete liquidation'
within the meaning of sections 331 and 337." The court finds no reorganization because of
business discontinuity). Other courts began their statutory analysis with the observation that
there would have been a complete liquidation if the business assets had not been transferred
to a new corporation. See, e.g., DeGroff v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 59, 69 (1970) ("D" reorganization found in fairly standard case); Moffatt v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 558, 572 (1964),
aff'd, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1966) ("D" reorganization also
found); Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144, 157 (1962) (reorganization denied).
5. I.R.C. § 336(a) (1976).
6. Id. For a discussion of the reincorporation bailout see Clark, The Morphogenesis of
Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 125-30 (1977).
7. I.R.C. §§ 165, 331, 1001, 1202, 1211, 1221 and 1222 deal with capital transactions.
See also Heller v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945) (investment banking reincorporation attempt).
8. I.R.C. § 334(a) (1976).
9. See Jackson, The Reincorporation Problem: Form a Limited Partnership and Carry
On Business as Usual, 10 GA. ST. B.J. 385 (1974). Even the transfer to another corporation is
not necessarily fatal. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144, 157 (1962) (reorganization not found because inter alia the new corporation contained more than 20% of new
stockholders).
10. This transfer should be tax free under I.R.C. § 351 (1976). The reincorporation device
really doesn't rest on I.R.C. § 351. Normally there is little gain, however, since the
assets have received a stepped-up basis under I.R.C. § 334(a) (1976). See infra text accompanying note 11; Clark, supra note 6, at 127 n.157.
I1. The reincorporation device may also be used to reduce exposure to the accumulated
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Essentially, the reincorporating shareholders exploit the fact that Subchapter C often allows transactions with the same economic consequences to
be cast in more than one form.12 The same economic effect of the reincorporation scheme, the distribution of excess cash to shareholders coupled with the
continuity of corporate and shareholder interests, could be accomplished by
paying a simple dividend, redeeming stock, or reorganizing the corporation.
The tax consequences of each of these different classifications, however, would
be very different.
If cast in the form of a dividend or proportionate redemption, the tax
advantages of the liquidation step of the reincorporation would be lost. The
shareholders would have to pay tax at ordinary income rates on excess cash
withdrawn from corporate solution to the extent of the corporate earnings
and profits. In addition, there would be no stepped-up basis of the operating
assets to depredate in later years, and the corporation's other tax attributes
would not be destroyed. 13 On the other hand, the shareholders would not have
to pay tax on the appreciation built up in the corporate operating assets. 14 If
the transaction were cast in the form of a reorganization, the tax consequences
would be very similar to those of a dividend or redemption", with an important
difference. The excess cash withdrawn would be treated as boot' and taxed
earnings tax imposed by I.R.C. § 531 (1976), to inject preferred stock into the capitalization
while avoiding I.R.C. § 306 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), and to issue debt securities without
dividend consequences. See B. BrrrKER & J. EusrrcE, supra note 3, at %14.54(1).
12. Cf. Clark, supra note 6, at 127-28 n.157.
13. As to a dividend, in inflationary times the excess cash withdrawn from corporate
solution will generally be covered by corporate earnings and profits under I.R.C. § 316 (1976
& Supp. I1 1979) and therefore taxed at ordinary income rates under I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) (1976).
Redemption, in these circumstances, would be "essentially equivalent to a dividend" under
I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) (1976), none of the safe harbors of I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (1976) would apply,
and therefore, pursuant to I.R.C. § 302(d) (1976), the distribution would be taxed as ordinary
income. If only excess cash is distributed, the operating assets remain in corporate solution
and receive no stepped-up basis.
14. The discounted present value of the extra depreciation deductions made possible by
the stepped-up basis in the operating assets may be well worth the price of a present capital
gains tax. See Clark, supra note 6, at 126; Nicholson, Liquidation-Reincorporation,B.N.A. TAX
MGMT. PoRTFoLio No. 335 A-i (1976).
15. In comparison to the reincorporation benefits listed supra note 5 and the accompany.
ing text, the tax consequences of a reorganization are: recognition either to the corporation,
I.R.C. § 361(b)(2> (1976), or to the shareholders, I.R.C. § 356(c) (1976); neither a step-up nor
a step-down in the operating assets' basis, I.R.C. § 362(b) (1976); carryover of the earnings
and profits account from the old corporation to the new corporation, I.R.C. §§ 381(a)(1) (1976)
and (c)(2) (1976 & Supp. I1 1979); exposure to the Accumulated Earnings Tax, I.R.C.
§ 535(c)(2), (3) & (4) (West Supp. 1982); tainting of any preferred stock issued, I.R.C.
§§ 306(c)(1)(B) & 356(c) (1976 & Supp. I1 1979); and treatment of additional debt services
issued as boot, I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(2) & 356(a) (1976).
16. I.R.C. § 356(a)(1) (1976). Boot, under these circumstances, almost certainly would
have the effect of a dividend and be included in the recipient's gross income to be taxed at
ordinary rates under I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) (1976). The treatment of "boot," however, is not
exactly the same as that of a dividend. A minor difference is that I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (1976)
lacks the corresponding I.R.C. § 316(a)(2) (1976) provision for payment out of current earnings.
Cf. Vesper Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 200, 205 (8th Cir. 1942) (predecessor of I.R.C.
§ 356(a)(2) interpreted as also referring to current earnings. "It would be an unreasonable
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as ordinary income only to the lesser extent of the gain realized, or the earn17
ings and profits of the liquidating corporation.
Recently, the reincorporation device has taken a number of new forms. In
the most common, the old corporation sells its operating assets to a preexisting corporation owned by the same shareholders. The old corporation
then liquidates, distributing its excess cash, and any cash received from the
pre-existing corporation in the sale, to these shareholders. If everything goes
according to plan, the old corporation's gain on the sale of the operating assets
is not recognized 8 and the shareholders receive capital gain treatment on the
liquidation. Other more sophisticated versions of the reincorporation device
involve the use of strawmen, 19 circular flows of borrowed cash, 20 intervening

construction . . . to draw a technical distinction between current and accumulated earn'). More important are the limitations discussed infra note 17 and accompanying
ings ...
text. It should be noted that in Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 890 (5th Cir. 1966)
("D" and "F" reorganization found), the court determined that I.R.C. § 301 should apply in an
'T" reorganization. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
17. I.R.C. H3 354(a) & 356(a) (1976). See, e.g., Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
420 (1970) (step-up in basis at death under I.R.C. § 1014(a) means little gain); Lesser v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 306 (1956) (of the approximately $200,000 received by shareholders,
ordinary-income treatment was limited to the approximately $25,000 gain, even though the
liquidating corporation had about $170,000 in earnings and profits). See also Atlas Tool Co.
v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860 (,Sd Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980) (of the approximately $482,000 received by the stockholders, ordinary income treatment limited to about
$440,000 earnings and profits of liquidating corporation, even though the gain was about
$472,000); American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970) (treatment limited to
earnings and profits of liquidating corporation); Altenpohl v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1377 (1977) (treatment limited to earnings and profits of liquidating corporation);
Estate of Bell v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1221 (1971) (same); but see Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966) (treatment limited to combined earnings and profits
of both liquidating and receiving corporations); Baker, Recent Developments in the Service's
War Against Liquidation-Reincorporations,49 J. TAX'N 82, 83 (1978) (suggesting Davant's
position may prevail).
18. I.R.C. § 337(a) (1976).
19. See Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966) (sale to attorney who
reconveyed to new corporation); Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966) (com
panion case to Reef; sale to son of petitioner's attorney, who reconveyed to new corporation);
United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953) (transfer
to liquidating trustees who, pursuant to directions from former stockholders, reconveyed
assets to new corporations); Henricksen v. Briacks, 137 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1943), af'g, 43 F.
Supp. 254 (W.D. Wash. 1942) (essentially same as Arcade). The strawman device did not
work in Reef and Davant, and its successful use in Arcade (and by implication Briacks) is
questionable. B. BIrER & J. EusncE, supra note 3, at %14.54; cf. Liddon v. Commissioner, 230
F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956) (Arcade narrowed over the dissent of its
author).
20. See Reef Co. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1965) (strawman uses notes
to purchase stock, repaid with cash from new corporation); Davant v. Commissioner, 366
F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966) (strawman's purchase financed by one-day bank loan); Heller v.
Commissioner, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945) (bank loan); Grubbs
v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 42 (1962) (new corporation issued checks to old for assets, old used
to redeem stock of its shareholders, who used part of cash distributed by new corporation
to purchase new corporation stock).
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estates, 21 related persons, 22 and related corporations.2 3 It appears that taxpayers
are often advised to set up multiple corporations with an eye toward later
liquidation of one of the corporations when sufficient earnings and profits
24
have been built up.
21. See Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 420 (1970) (corporation liquidated
pursuant to decedents will; no reorganization found upon reincorporation of the assets),
But cf. Ringwalt v. United States, 549 F.2d 89 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 906 (1977),
afJ'g 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 119864 (D. Neb. 1975) (reorganization found where trustee
of Clifford trust owning 84% of old corporation transferred assets to new corporation
owned 84% by trustee in his own right). See generally O'Connell, Postmortem LiquidationReincorporation:Alternative to 303, 29 C.L.U.J. 45 (1975); Bernstein, Can an Estate or Third
Corporation be Used to Avoid Liquidation-Reincorporation?,34 J. TAX'N 162 (1971).
22. See Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 420 (1970). But see Stanton v. United
States, 512 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1975) (suggesting in dictum that 49% stock interest of wife should
be aggregated with 51% of husband for purposes of I.R.C. § 368(c) (1976)).
23. See Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971) (no reorganization found
in transfer of Los Angeles auto dealership in which taxpayer was a principal); cf. Grubbs v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 42 (1962) (reorganization found in Burbank auto dealership in
which Robert Breech was also a principal, but not as to Robert Breech). See also Bernstein,
supra note 21; Third CorporationHelps ReincorporationTrap, 35 J. TAX'N 89 (1971). A major
drawback to using the "D" reorganization to stem the reincorporation device is that the attribution rules of I.R.C. § 318 only apply to those provisions specifically referring to it,
I.R.C. § 318(a)(1) (1976), and without such specific reference, courts are reluctant to extend
the scope of the section. See, e.g., Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 1971)
(intervening corporation); Berghash v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 743, 757 (1965), afg'd, 361 F.2d
257 (2d Cir. 1966) (refuse to attribute because of option to purchase); Ringwalt v. United
States, 549 F.2d 89 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 906 (1977), aff'g, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9864 (D. Neb. 1975) (transfer from old corporation with trustee as stockholder to new
corporation with trustee in his individual capacity as stockholder) is authority for the contrary
position, but neither the district court nor the court of appeals seemed to have focused
closely on the issue. Stanton v. United States, 512 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1975), also seems to have
missed this point in its dictum. See B. Brrram & J. Eusnc, supra note 3, at %14.54(4); Clark,
supra note 6, at 126-27 n.156.
24. Two cases, Capital Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 416 (1978) and Atlas Tool
Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980) provide convenient examples of integrated corporation possibilities. In Capital Sales, the old corporation
had three stockholders and owned a lucrative franchise to distribute Modernfold doors. The
franchisor wanted another distributor and the stockholders were able to have the franchise
granted to another corporation substantially owned by them. The Tax Court found that the
major asset, the franchise, was not transferred from the old to the new corporation, but
rather withdrawn from the old corporation by the franchisor and then given to the new
corporation. Therefore "substantially all" of the assets were not transferred from old to
new as required by I.R.C. § 354(b)(1)(A) (1976) and no reorganization could be found. Cf.
Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1966),
aff'g 42 T.C. 558 (1964) (Pontiac dealership deemed "transferred" from one corporation to
another). Perhaps not surprisingly, Capital Sales was reversed by the Fifth Circuit. Simon v.
Commissioner, 644 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
In Atlas Tool, the principal company sold model railroads, and prior to 1960 had also
manufactured them. In 1960 a separate manufacturing company was set up to supply the
principal company. When approximately $250,000 of earnings were built up in the manufacturing company, the sole stockholder of both decided to liquidate the manufacturing
company and rely on foreign suppliers for the models the principal company sold. The
manufacturing company's operating equipment was purchased by the principal company (and
its employees were absorbed by this company) and this equipment sat idle for three months
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DevelopmentsPrior to the 1954 Code
The basic postulates of corporate taxation were set in place during the
first third of this century, primarily between the enactment of the corporate
tax in 190923 and the General Utilities case of 1935.2 6 Congress chose to tax
corporate earnings twice, first at the relatively low corporate income rates, and
again at the usually higher individual rates upon distribution of earnings to
shareholders. Long-term capital gain treatment, justified in part as a crude
averaging device,27 was granted to sales and quasi-sales of corporate shares,
but denied to dividend distributions. This set in motion a continuing dance
between the Service 28 and shareholders. While the straight-forward system of
when the principal (and surviving) company began to experience difficulties with its foreign
suppliers and began to operate the liquidated company's equipment. It also used the liquidated company's former employees. Not surprisingly on these facts, a "D" reorganization
was found, with the usual detrimental consequences to the shareholder.
But what if the principal company had neither bought the old operating equipment, nor
hired the employees? Could the shareholder of both have simply taken the opportunity of
the liquidation to sell off the old equipment and purchase new equipment in the name of
the new surviving principal company so that no equipment was transferred? See James
Armour, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295, 299 (1964) (new corporation began to purchase
construction equipment formerly retained from corporation to be liquidated). Could it have
fired the old company's employees, and allowed them to apply for jobs with the surviving
company? Cf. Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), (some employees
returned to work with old manager-shareholder); Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894,
900-01 (5th Cir. 1981) ("a sole legal practitioner owning nothing but a desk and a chair
could accumulate earnings, then set up a new corporation and liquidate the old at capital
gains rates-so long as he is careful to buy a new desk and chair for the new corporation,
rather than transferring the old").
And what about the reverse possibilities? I.R.C. § 354(b)(1)(A) (1976) requires that "substantially all" of the assets of the liquidating corporation be transferred. Why could an
operating compay, even the principal company which a few years prior had employed the
reincorporation device discussed in the previous paragraph, not split its business into vertical
components, transferring some operating assets to one and the rest to a second, and then
liquidate the parent, distributing the stock of each new company and the excess cash to its
waiting stockholder? Unless two corporations can be the corporation referred to in I.R.C.
§ 354(b)(1)(A), there can be no divisive reorganization pursuant to which the Service can
impose "boot" under I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (1976). See S. REP'. No. 1635, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 265
(1954) ("Exchanges in reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(D) are included only when the
transferor corporation transfers substantially all of its assets to a single transferee corporation." Emphasis added). See generally B. BITrsFR & J. EusTicE, supra note 3, at 14.54(2)
n.438 & 1454(4); Nicholson, supra note 14, at A-10.
Integrated corporations also appear in Associated Mach. Inc. v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d
622 (9th Cir. 1968); Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966); Smothers v. United
States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19216 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Rose v. United States, 43 A.F.T.R.2d
(P-H) 79-454 (W.D. Wash. 1978); Workman v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1584 (1977);
Altenpohl v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1377 (1977); and DeGroff v. Commissioner, 54
T.C. 59 (1970).
25. Pub. L. No. 5, 36 Stat. 11 (1909).
26. General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). See Clark, supra
note 6, at 130-35.
27. See generally Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under the
Federal Income Tax, 1913-1948, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 12, 22 (1949); see also Maxhall, Capital Gains
Taxation- The First One Hundred Years, 41 LA. L. REV. 81, 93 (1980).
28. The term "Service" will be used herein as a convenient way of anthromorphisizing
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double-taxation produced tax treatment less favorable than ordinary rates,
shareholders able to couple low corporate rates with deferred capital gains
rates on sale or liquidation, could frequently achieve more favorable treatment than they could under ordinary individual tax rates. Bailouts occurred
when shareholders attempted both to achieve capital gain tax rates on the
distribution of profits from the corporation and to keep operating business
29
assets in corporate solution.
In 1921, Congress added reorganization distributions to the two other basic
types of corporate distributions (dividends and liquidations). A corporate reorganization usually involves the transfer of a business enterprise to a new
corporation. While the surface events in a reorganization look like exchanges,
in reality there is often a substantial continuity of interest both at the corporate
level, where the business's assets remain in corporate solution, and at the shareholder level, where shareholders maintain a continuing stake in the corporate
venture. Therefore Congress thought it inappropriate to tax certain types of reorganization transactions.o Therefore, while dividend distributions are
generally taxable to the recipient at ordinary rates, and liquidating distributions
are generally taxable at capital gains rates, reorganization "distributions" are
generally not taxed at all; recognition of gain or loss is deferred until a more
appropriate time.
Capturing the reorganization concept in a statutory net, however, proved
difficult. The provisions lent themselves to abuse by taxpayers seeking non.
recognition protection for corporate bailouts cast in the form of reorganizations.
The reorganization provisions might have been repealed in 1934 if Congress
had not recognized, and apparently encouraged, judicial development of
flexible methods of tax interpretation to stop this abuse.3 '
the government in a number of guises, and is not limited strictly to designating the Internal
Revenue Service.
29. The definition of the term "bailout" is somewhat imprecise. See Clark, supra note 6,
at 95, n.13. In general the term refers to illicit extraction of retained corporate earnings at
capital gains, rather than ordinary-income rates, but what counts as "illicit" is not certain.
If the sale of stock to a third person is the extraction of the economic value attributable to
the retained earnings built up in the corporation, then the sale of such stock is a way of
extracting retained earnings, but everyone would agree that such a transaction is legitimate.
Complete and permanent liquidation is also a perfectly legitimate way of extracting such
earnings. See supra note 4. These legitimate "bailouts" (if that's what they are) reflect uncertain congressional policies and lead to confused and inconsistent interpretation of the
statutory language.
30. H.R. REP. No. 179 & S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). See generally
R. PAUL, STUDM IN FEDERAL TAXATION 3 (3d Series 1940).
31. As reported by the court in Baley v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 237, 242 n.12 (3d Cir.
1946): "During the debate on the 1934 Revenue Act, the entire question of the retention of
the reorganization sections of the Act was under serious consideration. On December 4, 1933,
a subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee proposed the abolition of the
exchange and reorganization provisions of section 112. This was rejected. In its final form,
the Revenue Act of 1934 contained what are substantially the same provisions of the present
ACL"
In the Report accompanying the submission of the Revenue Act of 1934 (H.R. REP. No.
704, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)), Chairman Doughton of the Committee stated: "The reorganization provisions have been in effect for many years, having been adopted in substantially
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Courts began their major contributions to the corporate tax system at about
this time. An examination of various judicial methods of tax interpretation
developed to stop reorganization bailouts will aid in understanding the theories
underlying the functionally unrelated test. These methods focus on events
used to classify a transaction for tax purposes.
The first theory was developed in Gregory v. Helvering,32 a 1935 case involving a divisive reorganization bailout. Within the space of four days the
sole shareholder of a closely-held corporation created and destroyed a spin-off
corporation for the sole purpose of extracting property owned by her original
corporation. The transaction contained all the appropriate steps the reorganization sections literally required and the shareholder, Mrs. Gregory,
claimed their tax benefits; 33 but Learned Hand, speaking for the Second
Circuit, denied her those benefits. Rejecting the Commissioner's argument that

their present form in 1924. They state in detail how each step of a reorganization should
be treated for tax purposes. The policy was adopted of permitting reorganizations to take a
wide variety of forms, without income-tax liability. As a result, astute lawyers frequently
attempted, especially during the prosperous years, to take advantage of these provisions by
arranging in the technical form of a reorganization, within the statutory definition, what
were really sales. A number of these cases have been carried to the courts, with results on the
whole favorable to the Government. The courts have shown a commendable tendency to
look through the mere form of the transaction into its substance." Id. at 242, n.12.
32. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934) (opinion by L. Hand), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
33. As concisely reported by the Second Circuit, the facts and hoped-for reorganization
benefits were as follows: "The taxpayer owned all the shares of the United Mortgage Corporation, among whose assets were some of the shares of another company, the Monitor Securities
Corporation. In 1928 it became possible to sell the Monitor shares at a large profit, but if this
had been done directly, the United Mortgage Corporation would have been obliged to pay a
normal tax on the resulting gain, and the taxpayer, if she wished to touch her profit, must
do so in the form of a dividend, on which a surtax would have been assessed against her
personally. To reduce these taxes as much as possible, the following plan was conceived and
put through: The taxpayer incorporated in Delaware a new company, organized ad hoc,
and called the Averill Corporation, to which the United Mortgage Corporation transferred
all its shares in the Monitor Securities Corporation, under an agreement by which the
Averill Corporation issued all its shares to the taxpayer. Being so possessed of all the
Averill shares, she wound up the Averill company three days later, receiving as a liquidating
dividend the Monitor shares, which she thereupon sold. It is not disputed that all these
steps were part of one purpose to reduce taxes, and that the Averill Corporation, which was
in existence for only a few days, conducted no business and was intended to conduct none,
except to act as conduit for the Monitor shares in the way we have described. The taxpayer's
return for the year 1928 was made on the theory that the transfer of the Monitor shares to
the Averill Corporation was a 'reorganization' under section 112(i)(1)(B) of the Revenue Act
of 1928 (26 U.S.C.A. § 2112(i)(1)(B)), being a 'transfer by a corporation of . . . a part of its
assets to another corporation' in such circumstances that immediately thereafter 'the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are
transferred.' Since the transfer was a reorganization, she claimed to come within section 112(g)
of that act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 2112(g), and that her 'gain' should not be 'recognized,' because
the Averill shares were 'distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization.' The Monitor
shares she asserted to have been received as a single liquidating dividend of the Averill
Corporation, and that as such she was only taxable for them under section 115(c), 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 2115(c) and upon their value less the cost properly allocated to the AveriIl shares." Helvering
v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
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Mrs Gregory's tax avoidance motive should be used to reclassify the transaction, 34 Judge Hand focused on the purpose of the reorganization provisions
and argued they were intended to cover business rather than paper transactions.
Since Mrs. Gregory's transaction lacked independent non-tax economic effect,
it did not fall within the purpose of the reorganization provisions. The
Supreme Court subsequently affirmed. 85
Economic effect also was at issue in Minnesota Tea v. HeIvering.36 There
shareholders attempted to gain the nonrecognition benefits of the reorganization provisions by paying the corporation's creditors with cash funneled
through the shareholders, rather than having the corporation pay the creditors
directly. Since the transfer to the shareholders had no significant independent
economic effect because they were obligated to pay the cash over to the
37
creditors, the court disregarded this step as "meaningless" and "unnecessary"
and denied the shareholders the reorganization tax benefits.
Attempting to gain reorganization tax benefits, the taxpayers in both
Gregory and Minnesota, Tea inserted an extra step into their respective
transactions.38 Each court disregarded the additional step and treated the
transactions as if they had been consummated directly. Despite these similarities, however, the Minnesota Tea court's reasoning seemed broader than that
of the Gregory court. In both cases there were two or more formal paths to a
given economic result. Gregory implied that the shareholders' chosen path
would be accepted if each of its steps had some independent economic effect.
Minnesota Tea, however, implied that the shareholders' path would not be
supported unless it had some significant independent economic effect.
In Bazley v. Commissioner,39 the shareholder tried to bailout corporate
earnings by distributing long-term callable bonds through the recapitalization
provisions. From one perspective, the case provided a somewhat narrower
target for the Service than did the transactions in Gregory and Minnesota Tea.
Since the suspect transaction successfully placed the bonds in the shareholder's
hands and reshuffled the corporation's capital structure, it seemed the shareholder had not inserted an unnecessary additional step to gain the reorganization provisions' benefits. The Bazley court nevertheless applied the Gregory
rationale without difficulty and held that such a transaction was not within
34. Judge Hand, in rejecting use of Mrs. Gregory's tax avoidance motives to classify the
transaction, wrote: "Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as
possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the treasury; there is
not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." 69 F.2d at 810.

35. 293 U.S. 465f (1935).
86. 802 U.S. 609 (1937).
37. Id.at 613-14. The court analogized that "[a] given result at the end of a straight
path is not made a different result because reached by following a devious path." Id. at 618.
88. In Gregory, this step was through the transitory corporation, in Minnesota Tea,
through the shareholders.
39. 831 U.S. 787 (1947), rehearing denied and opinion amended, 32 U.S. 752 (1947),
aff'g 155 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1946), aff'g in turn 4 T.C. 897 (1945). Of importance to the later
discussion is the fact that the original Third Circuit opinion was withdrawn and a new
opinion, also holding for the Service, substituted. The first opinion is found at 46-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) f 9185 (1946). See infra note 148.
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the purpose of the reorganization provisions. For important technical reasons, 40
the Court buttressed its position with two other arguments, both relevant to
the later discussion of the functionally unrelated test.
First, Bazley stated that the distribution of the bonds was "unrelated" to
the "modification of the capital account."4 1 So viewed, of course, the distribution was no longer covered by the predecessor non-recognition provisions of
Instead,
either I.R.C. § 368 (reorganizations) or I.R.C. § 1031 (stock-for-stock).
2
dividend.4
ordinary-income
simple
a
being
to
it reverted
Second, Bazley noted that "nothing was accomplished that would not have
43
been accomplished by outright debenture dividend." The Bazley court, therefore, implied that since the economic effect of the transaction fell within two
equally valid tax classifications, the taxpayer should be held to the least favorable of the two unless an independent economic effect from casting the transaction in the more favorable form could be shown. At the end of his career,
Learned Hand, the author of Gregory, also seemed to be leaning toward this
second view, requiring the taxpayer not only to justify the basic transaction
on independent economic grounds, but also to justify his reasons for choosing
between two more-or-less equally appropriate formal ways of casting it.The transactions in Minnesota Tea, and the bailouts attempted in Gregory
and Bazley, were all dependent upon the reorganization provisions for success.
45
and, to say the least,
The reincorporation device does not rely on them,

40. 331 U.S. at 740 (1946). Simple denial of the reorganization provisions in Bazley was
arguably not enough, for the transaction did not necessarily drop back into dividend classification as did the transaction in Gregory. The taxpayer made the argument below, and to the
Supreme Court, that even if the reorganization provisions were denied, this transaction fell
under the stock-for-stock "boot" exchange provisions of section 1031(b)'s predecessor. Presunably the benefits of this predecessor section could have been denied as well, but doing
so would have been more difficult. This line of argument was briefed by the parties before
the Supreme Court, but was not mentioned in the Court's opinion, leaving the reader of
the opinion uncertain as to whether Bazley is simply a Gregory clone, or something more.
See American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204, 229 (1970) (interpreting both Gregory
and Bazley as denying reorganization treatment).
41. 331 U.S. at 742.
42. Cf. 4 T.C. at 902 & 155 F.2d at 239 n.4. The reference is made explicit in the withdrawn opinion of the Third Circuit (46-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 119135, quoted in part in
Nicholson, supra note 14, at A-19 (modern sets of U.S. Tax Cas. do not contain the opinion)).
Finally, the point is discussed in ihe briefs. See Brief for Petitioner at 31-34, Brief for the
Respondent at 17-18, Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
it was contended that this was a factual issue found against the taxpayer by the Tax
Court. 155 F.2d at 240. Cf. 46-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19135 (withdrawn opinion); infra
note 148 (application of the step transaction doctrine held a factual question unreviewable
under Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943) (question of whether recovery
attributable to a series of prior transactions was attributable to one or all of the series; tax
court's determination controlled)). But this was actually the forerunner of the method of
interpretation which re-surfaces in Rev. Ruling 61-156 discussed infra.
43. 331 U.S. at 743.
44. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 410 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hand dissenting in a
case involving question of whether transfer to closely held corporation was debt or equity).
See Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440,
463 (1968).
45. See supra note 10.
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it is somewhai ironic that the narrow reorganization pipeline designed to
provide the taxpayer with a tax-free conduit from one corporation to another 46
has been turned into a bulwark used by the Service to stop the reincorporating
shareholders from gaining the tax benefits of liquidation.
Under pre-1954 tax law, reclassification of the transaction as a "D" reorganization was the way courts most often stopped reincorporation bailouts.
This "D" classification fit the facts of most attempted bailouts and provided
the desired result of denying the shareholder most of his hoped-for reincorporation benefits. 47 In so doing, however, the statutory language had to be "interpret[ed], with considerable flexibility."48 Naturally, shareholders were not
similarly allowed to "interpret" the same provision when favorable to them 4o
and a double-standard was created. This is not as strange as it might seem,
however, for statutory language is often interpreted with an eye to its purpose.6o
46. The reorganization provisions were introduced in section 202(c)(2) of the Revenue
Act of 1921, Pub. Law No. 98, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 135, 42 Stat. 27. See H. REP. No. 350,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921); S. REP. No. 27, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921) ("The amendment . .. will ... permit business to go forward with readjustments required by existing
conditions. . . ."); 61 CoNG. REc. 6563 & 6566 (remarks of Senator McCumber). See also id.
at 6563 (Senator Watson's explanation).
47. See supranotes 15 & 16.
48. B. BrrrER &J. EusrcE, supra note 3, at f 14.54(2). See also Clark, supra note 6, at 128.
49. Clark, supra note 6, at 128. Also: "in some very difficult cases, the courts have ignored
the plain language of the statute to protect the revenues .. " Report of the Committee on
Corporate Stockholder Relationships, 28 A.B.A. TAX SEC. BULL., 32, 38 (1965).
50. See generally C. SANDs, 2A STATUrEs & STATUTORY CONSTRUCtION § 45.09 (rev. ed. 1972).
Surprisingly few courts opposed use of flaxible statutory construction to impose the "D"
reorganization. The Sixth Circuit did resist briefly in United States v. Arcade, 203 F.2d 230
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953). In Arcade, the old company dissolved and transferred its assets to liquidating trustees who were then instructed by the former shareholders
to re-transfer the assets to a new corporation in return for its shares, which in turn were
then passed through to these shareholders. The government argued that these events were
part of an integrated plan and presumably on a Minnesota Tea step-transactions rationale,
constituted a "D" reorganization. But the court refused to impose a "D" reorganization on
these facts. First, it echoed Hand's Gregory language that a taxpayer may legally decrease
his taxes "by any means which the law permits," citing the Supreme Court Gregory opinion.
Id. at 232. Second, it noted that the former shareholders were under no "contractual
obligations" to instruct the liquidating trustees to retransfer the assets. Id. at 233. Presumably this meant that, unlike Gregory or Minnesota Tea, the intervening step had some, even
some substantial, independent economic effect. Third, the court seemed impressed by the
technical nature of the Code's requirements, particularly in the reorganization area, and cited
the Treasury regulations against the Service, particularly Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.112(g)-6 (under
§ 112 of the 1939 Code) which provided that "the adoption of (the plan of reorganization)
must be shown by the acts of (each corporation's) duly constituted responsible officers, and
appear upon the official records of the corporation." Id. at 233. No such plan had been
adopted by either corporation.
However, only four years later, the Sixth Circuit fell in line. In Liddon v. Commissioner,
30 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1957), Arcade was distinguisted on the
grounds that it involved a straight liquidation-reincorporation, with assets distributed to
liquidating trustees, while Liddon involved a transfer directly by the old corporation to the
new. Judge McAllister, author of Arcade, dissented on the grounds that the major asset of
the old corporation, a Pontiac dealership, was not "transferred" to the new corporation. See
also Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 196 (1954), aff'd, 231 F.,d 288
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A statutory provision animated by two spirits, creating two distinct lines of cases
is unusual, but not unique.
It soon became clear, however, that the courts' interpretation of the "D"type reorganization was not a panacea. Two major problems stood out. First,
the statutory requirement that the transferor, or its shareholders, be "in control"
of the transferee corporation seemed to allow leakage around the "D" bulwark. "Control" was and is defined as 80% ownership.5 1 Shareholders
thus need only introduce 20% "new blood" into the new corporation to avoid
reorganization classification and gain reincorporation benefits.5 2 Second, even
when the statutory provisions were satisfied, the consequences were not always
the ordinary-income treatment desired by the Service because such treatment
was limited to the lesser of the gain realized in the transaction or the earnings
and profits of the old transferor corporation. 53 This seemed to allow for leakage through the "D" bulwark. For example, where the old corporation's stock
had been stepped-up at death, 4 there would be little gain and, therefore,

(7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1957) (corporation-to-corporation transfer of
whiskey assets) distinguished Arcade on the same grounds as Liddon. Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1954) (liquidation - reincorporation through liquidating
trustees similar to Arcade) refused to follow Arcade, id. at 57 n.3, and Lesser v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 306 (1956) (apartments owned by old corporation distributed to shareholders
and reconveyed to two new corporations) also rejected Arcade's reasoning. Id. at 813.
Courts have generally been happy to use flexible means of interpretation, particularly the
step-transactions doctrine, to stop the reincorporation device, See cases collected in Nicholson,
supra note 14, at A-3 through A-4 on this point. See also Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic
Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942) (bankruptcy reorganization in which assets were distributed to the bankruptcy trustee and then purchased by new corporation formed by creditors
of the bankrupt corporation; new shareholders successfully argued that intervening bankruptcy
trustee should be disregarded; the court agreed: "-Some contention . . . is made that this
Yet, the separate steps were integrated
transaction did not meet the statutory standard ....
parts ot a single scheme."). Id. at 184.
51. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(h), 53 Stat. 40 (now I.R.C. § 368(c) (1976)). ("As
used in this section the term 'control' means the ownership of stock possessing at least 80
percentum of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at
least 80 percentum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the
corporation."). The definition was introduced in the 1921 Act. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L.
No. 98, ch. 136, § 202(c)(3), 42 Stat. 227 (1921) (80 percent required in a more primitive
version of § 112(h)).
52. Austin Transit, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 849 (1953), acq. 1954-1 C.B. 3 (31%
new blood injected).
53. See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(c), 53 Stat. 89. (if gain made in
pursuance of a plan of reorganization but "has the effect of the distribution of a taxable
dividend, then there shall be taxed as a dividend to each distributee such amount of the
gain recognized . . . as is not in excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings
...
). These limitations were enacted in essentially the modern form as
and profits.
§ 203(d)(1) & (2) of the 1924 Act. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, See also S. REP.
No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 14-15 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 13774, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. § 2
(1923) (amending § 202(e) of the 1921 Act to the more modem form).
54. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 113(a)(5), 53 Stat. 41 (essentially the same as I.R.C.
§ 1014 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The step-up at death antedates the reorganization provisions.
See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 135, § 202(a)(3), 42 Stat. 277; H.R. REP. No.850, 67th Cong., 1st

Sess. (1921).
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much of the old corporation's earnings could be extracted without fear.6 5 In
sum, the 80% control provision and frequent stepped-up basis status allowed
some reincorporations to leak around, and some to leak through, the "D" reorganization bulwark.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FUNCTIONALLY UNRELATED
TEST UNDER THE 1954 CODE AS A SOLUTION
TO THE REINCORPORATION PROBLEM

Even before the 1954 Code, some of the bailout devices which relied on
the reorganization provisions were dosed by Congress.6 6 The new Code consolidated these early gains, significantly strengthening the Gregory, Minnesota
Tea, and Bazley barriers to reorganization bailouts by imposing new legislative hurdles.s 7 The tax free "D" reorganization conduit was narrowed by requiring that "substantially all" of the transferor's assets be acquired by the
acquiring company, 5 and, inter alia, the proceeds of the transferor be distributed in liquidation.59 This narrowing of the reorganization provisions was
designed to stop bailouts by taxpayers seeking reorganization treatment.60 It
had the unintended effect of reducing the effectiveness of the "D" reorganization provisions in stopping the reincorporation device.61
55. See Lesser v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 306 (1956) (1939 Code case where widow, in
her individual capacity and as trustee of a family by-pass trust, had gain of only approximately $25,000 on reincorporation boot distribution of approximately $200,000 from a
corporation with earnings and profits of approximately $170,000). See also supra notes 17 and
21.
56. For example, the spin-off provision relied upon by Mrs. Gregory was repealed by
the Revenue Act of 1934 and then was reinstated with qualifying safeguards in 1951. See
B. Bni-Tri
& J. EusricE, supra note 3, at 13.02. But the closure was often, as it had been
in Gregory, judicial rather than legislative. See, e.g., Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau &
Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Corporate Distributions, Organizations, and
Reorganizations, 68 HARv. L. Rxv. 393, 396 (1955) (the "substantially disproportionate" requirement of the present I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (1976) adopted in a general way by judicial
interpretation).
57, See, e.g., I.R.C. § 306 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979) (preferred stock bailouts). See generally
B. BrrrxxR & J. Eusrica, supra note 3, at %I 14.17 &:14.35; Clark, supra note 6, at 123-25. As
the reincorporation device shows, there are a variety of non-reorganization bailouts which
other Code sections are designed to stem. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 357(b) (1976); B. Bririta & J.
EusncE:, supra note 3, at 3.07(2).
58. I.R.C. § 354(b)(1)(A) (1976). This limitation was added by the Senate. See H.R. REP.
No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) (as reported by the Senate Finance Committee adopting
§ 354(b)(1)(A) (1976), which is identical to the modern provision).
59. I.R.C. § 354(b)(1)(B) (1976). See also I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (1976). The limitation was
added by the Senate, see H.R. Rzs'. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(D)
& 354(b)(1)(B) (1976) are identical to the modern provisions.
60. See Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed?, 77
HARv. L. Rnv. 1218, 1244-47 (1964).
61. This would not have been a problem as the bill was originally drafted, for the
House version contained an elaborate legislative structure intended to fill the reincorporation
gap. In the reworking of the bill on the Senate side, however, the House provision was
dropped without explanation. In the Conference Report the "Managers on the part of the
House" explained: "The House bill on Section 357 contained a provision dealing with a
device whereby it has been attempted to withdraw corporate earnings at capital gain rates
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Despite these two new requirements of section 354(b)(1), the "D" reorganization continues to be the principal barrier against reincorporation bailouts under the 1954 Code. As might be expected, courts interpret the old requirements of the "D" reorganization flexibility.6 2 In addition, the Service has
succeeded in extending this flexibility to the two new requirements. Courts have
found that "substantially all" the assets of the old corporation were "acquired"
by the new corporation when only the operating assets were transferred,6 3 when
only trained staff was transferred,64 and even when essential operating assets
were merely leased or otherwise "made available" to the new corporation.65
The tax court has also found that the "distribution requirement" of section
354(a)(2) was "constructively" met even though a substantial amount of assets
remained in corporate solution. 6
by distributing all the assets of a corporation in complete liquidation and promptly reincorporating the business assets. This provision gave rise to certain technical problems and
it has not been retained in the bill as recommended by the accompanying conference report.
It is the belief of the managers on the part of the House that, at the present time, the
possibility of tax avoidance in this area is not sufficiently serious to require a special
statutory provision. It is believed that this possibility can appropriately be disposed of by
judicial decision or by regulation within the framework of other provisions of the bill."
H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in, 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws
5301 (Emphasis added).
62. See, e.g., the discussion in Smothers v. United States, 79-I U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
ff 9216 (1979) (a fairly standard reincorporation case in which a "D" reorganization is found
to displace the § 337 treatment desired by the taxpayer) at 86,416. See generally B. BIrKEri
& J. EusricE, supra note 3, at 9 1,1.54(2); Nickelson, supra note 14, at A-9.
63. American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204, 221-22 (1970) (only 20% transferred,
but they included all the operating assets). But see Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262,
270 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1966) (Justice Craig dissenting on this point
stated "If Congress intended to limit the transfer of 'operative assets' it would have said
so"). rd. at 270. To the same effect is Justice Garza's dissent in Smothers v. United States,
647 F.2d 894, 901 (1981) ("[the majority] has relieved Congress of its burden to change
the law heretofore requiring that 'substantially all' of a corporation's assets be transferred ...").
64. 363 F.2d at 268 (skilled employees in engineering service business transferred to
new corporation along with the operating assets). Cf. Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676
(3d Cir. 1961) (discussion of transfer of service business' assets under the pre-1954 law).
65. James Armour, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295, 309 (1964) (office building owned
by old corporation was held by stockholder but leased to the new corporation). This
flexibility has not been extended to cases in which the operating assets are split into two
new corporations. See supra note 24.
66. Grubbs v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 42 (1962). David Grubbs, Robert Breech and
others were stockholders in the old corporation, which transferred its assets to a new
corporation and redeemed out Grubbs and the others, but not Breech, who used the old
corporation for unrelated purposes. The Service successfully applied the "D" reorganization
to Grubbs and the others, but did not attempt to tax Breech, the remaining stockholder, on
his "constructive distribution." It only urged that Breech had received such a dividend so
that it could successfully characterize the distributions to Grubbs and the others as "boot."
Surprisingly, the court, applied § 301 rather than § 356(a)((2) to the distribution. Id. at 52.
The same Robert Breech also successfully escaped reorganization treatment in another case
decided nine years after Grubbs. Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971) (by
interposing a corporation between himself and ownership of the new corporation, and
taking advantage of the fact that § 318 attribution rules do not apply to § 368(c).
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The Service has nevertheless continued to have problems using the "D"
reorganization to stop the reincorporation device. Even when flexibly interpreted, the "D" reorganization provision is simply too weak to be effective
in all cases. The two main problems under the 1939 Code continue to plague
the Service under the 1954 Code: the 80%o-control requirement of section 368(c)
means taxpayers can achieve the benefits of the reincorporation device by simply
introducing slightly more than 20%0 of new blood into the corporate structure, 67
an escape facilitated by the lack of section 318-type attribution rules; 6 and
even when a "D" reorganization can be imposed, the consequences are not
always equivalent to what the Service views as the appropriate dividend treatment. Rather, the "boot" provisions of section 356(a)(2) limit ordinary income
treatment to the lesser of the retained earnings of the transferor corporation
or the gain realized by the shareholder on the exchange.6 9
What Congress took away in statutory language in 1954, it apparently
restored in legislative history. The Senate dropped without explanation the
elaborate legislative structure in the House bill intended to fill the reincorporation gap. In the Conference Report, however, the House managers stated the
reincorporation device could "appropriately be disposed of by judicial decision
or by regulation within the framework of other provisions of the bill."7° Thus
if the additional statutory restrictions of the "D" reorganization provided
fewer planks from which to fashion a reincorporation barrier, the Conference
Report apparently provided better construction tools. With the rest of the
legislative history, this statement apparently delegated to the Service and to the
courts authority to creatively interpret the statutory language. Equipped with
this apparent new authority, the Service lost no time in issuing restrictive
regulations under sections 301 and 31 designed to stop leakage through
section 356(a)(2). In appropriate cases, the Service announced it would simply
treat reincorporation distributions as section 301-type dividends.71
67. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) & (c) (1976). See supra note 6.
68. I.R.C. § 318 (1976) only applies to sections which expressly incorporate it, which the
proposed House reincorporation section, supra note 61, did, and I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) & (c)
(1976) do not,
69. See supra note 17. Cf. supra note 55 (pre-1954 equivalent provisions).
70. See supra note 61.
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(1) (1960) reads as follows: "(1) Transactions treated as distributions. A distribution to shareholders with respect to their stock is within the terms of section
301 although it takes place at the same time as another transaction if the distribution is in
substance a separate transaction whether or not connected in a formal sense. This is most
likely to occur in the case of a recapitalization, a reincorporation, or a merger of a corporation with a newly organized corporation having substantially no property. For example, if a

corporation having only common stock outstanding, exchanges one share of newly issued
common stock and one bond in the principal amount of $10 for each share of outstanding
common stock, the distribution of the bonds will be a distribution of property (to the extent
of their fair market value) to which section 501 applies, even though the exchange of common
stock for common stock may be pursuant to a plan of reorganization under the terms of
section 368(a)(1)(E) (recapitalization) and even though the exchange of common stock for

common stock may be tax free by virtue of section 354."
Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(c) (1960) reads as follows: "(c) A liquidation which is followed by
a transfer to another corporation of all or part of the assets of the liquidating corporation
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Shortly thereafter Revenue Ruling 61-156,72 which contained the primitive
functionally unrelated test, was promulgated. Not surprisingly, the Ruling's
approach was potentially as useful in stemming the 80%o-control flow around
the "D" reorganization as it. was in preventing the dividend-within-gain flow
through it.7 The facts of Revenue Ruling 61-156 are relatively simple. Share-

holder owned all the stock of Old Corporation. In a purported section 337
transaction, Old Corporation transferred its operating assets to New Corporation in return for cash and 4570 of the shares which were to be issued by New
Corporation. Immediately thereafter, the other 55%o of New Corporation shares
were issued to unrelated public shareholders. Old Corporation was then liquidated and its cash and 45%/ of New Corporation in newly issued shares were
distributed to Shareholder.
The Ruling generally proposed altering the tax classification of the taxpayer's transaction by gerrymandering the facts. The 80%o-control problem
was handled by "disregarding" new investors, the dividend-within-gain
problem by viewing the boot distribution as "a separate dividend." 74 The
or which is preceded by such a transfer may, however, have the effect of the distribution
of a dividend or of a transaction in which no loss is recognized and gain is recognized only
to the extent of other property. See sections 301 and 356." (Emphasis added). Of course,
when the liquidation "may" have this effect is uncertain. This issue is still on the Service's
prime issue list: "Whether a purported liquidation is in fact a reorganization or is so
lacking in substance that it should be disregarded as a liquidation ....
The issue which
may be presented under the basic question includes, but is not limited to: whether the
amounts distributed to the sharcholders from the supposedly liquidated corporation (the
transferor) may be treated as a section 301 distribution. (Regs. 1.301-1(1)); whether the
amounts distributed to the shareholders from the surviving corporation (the transferee)
may be treated as a section 301 distribution separate from the reorganization; the technical
type of reorganization which in substance has occurred; and whether the shift in proprietary
interest at the shareholder level precludes a reorganization and converts the transaction into
a liquidation." (Emphasis added). Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) 100 0368.12-00.
721 Rev. Rul. 156, 1961-2 C.B. 62, rev'g Rev. Rul. 541, 1956-2 C.B. 189.
73. Herein references to the "dividend-within-gain problem." will be used as a shorthand way of labeling both I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (1976) problems: the limitation of dividend
treatment to the shareholder's gain on the exchange of his stock for the distribution from the
old corporation and the limitation of that treatment to the earnings and profits of the old
corporation.
74. The Ruling opened with a discussion of the 80%-control question. Even though 55%
of new blood was introduced into New Corporation, the Ruling imposed a reorganization
and denied Shareholder his bailout. It did so by disregarding the new 55% shareholders,
thereby treating Shareholder as the owner of 100% of the shares of New Corporation. So
viewed, the transaction was appropriately classified as an "'F"reorganization. Rev. Rul. 156,
1964-2 C.B. 62.
"F" reorganizations invariably qualify as "D" reorganizations as well. See, e.g., Reef Co.
v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125, 136, n.14 (5th Cir. 1966) The Ruling seems to indirectly
confirm this by couching the facts in language from which one would ordinarily infer the
existence of a "D" reorganization. Perhaps the point of the exclusion is that made in Reef:
"F" should control where a series of transactions qualify both as "D" and "F" reorganizations.
Id. at 136. Cf. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(A) (1976) ("D" reorganization controls over "C" where both
apply).
The Ruling does say that the transaction would also be an "E" reorganization, as it
almost certainly would not. See Nicholson, supra note 6, at A-11 to A-12; Wood, A Proposed
Treatment of Reincorporation Transactions,25 TAx L. REv. 282, 288 (1970).
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Ruling did not use the term "functionally unrelated," and the concept was
still ill-formed, but the functionally unrelated test was clearly at the heart
of the Ruling's solution to the 80%-control problem, and was one of the arguments underlying its solution to the dividend-within-gain problem.
Turning first to the 80% control problem, the Ruling invoked the lesscommon exclusionary form of the step-transaction doctrine. For years, courts
have been aggregating steps into a single transaction when those steps were
functionally related.- In Revenue Ruling 61-156, the Service simply applied
the converse of this procedure and separated steps which were functionally
unrelated.7 6 Arguably the dominant "function" of transferring the operating
assets to New Corporation and liquidating Old Corporation was "to withdraw
corporate earnings while continuing the equity interest in substantial part in a
business enterprise conducted in corporate form." 77 The sale to new investors
was functionally unnecessary to this dominant end, and therefore disregarded.
On the facts of the ruling, separating one part of a series of events, the injection of new blood, from the other parts, the transfer and liquidation, is
questionable. These events were probably not economically independent. The
new equity capital was probably necessary to supply the cash to pay Old
Corporation's Shareholder. Given the facts, it is also unlikely that these events
were even temporally independent. The disregarded event was bracketed on
the one side by the prior transfer of Old Corporation's operating assets and,
on the other, by the liquidation which followed the event. The Ruling also
states that its analysis is "equally applicable" to the facts of Revenue Ruling
56-541,78 in which the 55% of new investors were entwined in capital structure
of the new corporation from the beginning, further undercutting the argument that the injection of new blood is temporally independent.
Pursuant to a consent order entered in the case of Taxation With Representation Fund v.
Internal Revenue Service, 646 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the Service must release all its General
Counsel Memoranda (G.C.M.) underlying its revenue rulings from 1967 to the present. Since
the G.C.M.s underlying Rev. Rul. 61-156 were written before 1967, the consent order does not
mandate their release. At some time in the future, however, an independent Freedom of
Information Act request may secure them. The relevant G.C.M. numbers are 31698 and 31330.
Telephone interview with Mary Otto, Attorney in the Office of Chief Counsel, Disclosure
Litigation Division (June 10, 1982).
75. B. BrrrER & J. Eusric, supra note 3, at 1 14.54(1). As originally stated by R. Paul
and P. Zimet, the general "step transaction" test was "whether on a reasonable interpretation
of objective facts the steps were so interdependent that the legal relations created by one
transaction would have been fruitless without a completion of the series." Paul 8: Zimet, Step
Transactions,in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAxAiON 200, 254 (R. Paul, ed. 1938); see also
id4 at 245.
76. Cf. American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397, 405 (1948) (arising
under I.R.C. § 351 where the question was whether there was "control" for purposes of § 351
when, after the transfer, shares were issued to the public; court held there was control
because transaction would have been legally "fruitful" without issuance to the public).
77. Rev. Rul. 156, 1961-2 C.B. 62, 63. Cf. Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 510,
531 (1964) (finding the "principal purpose" of certain transactions was to siphon off accumulated earnings), aff'd in part and reutd in part, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965) (finding

that the business was discontinued and then revived).
78. Rev. Rul. 541, 1956-2 C.B. 189, rev'd, Rev. Rul. 156, 1961-2 C.B. 62.
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In contrast to the flexible interpretation of statutory language in other
reincorporation areas, courts have been reluctant to accept the functionally
unrelated test as a solution to the 80%-control problem. 79 Those courts which
have clearly focused on the issue have generally faulted the functionally unrelated test for improperly disregarding economically significant events. In
Breech v. United States,80 the majority shareholders of the old corporation
cleverly interposed another corporation between themselves and ownership
of the new corporation's shares.,' Thus, it could not strictly be said that they
owned 80% of the new corporation's shares, although they clearly had
beneficial control of such shares. The Breech court refused to come to the aid of
the Service by distorting the statute and rejected the argument that the transaction could have been done another way and if so, would have fallen under
another classification.

82

The Service has occasionally been successful in pressing its view, however. While the concept has not been accepted by other courts, Reef v. Com79. See, e.g. Berghash v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), aJJ"d, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1966) (no reorganization on 50% new blood injected) and Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.
144 (1962) (no reorganization on 28% new blood injected).
In Gallagher, a corporation, engaged in a service-oriented business, had built up approximately one million dollars worth of earnings and profits against working assets valued
at approximately $100,000. Old stockholders who had been active in the business had died,
and new service providers had entered tie business. In order to bring the new providers into
the business and eliminate the estates and widows of the old, a new corporation was formed
to which the $100,000 assets were sold, and the old corporation was liquidated. The crucial
element of the case was that 28% new blood was injected into the corporation. The Service
did not press the argument that the transaction was a "D" reorganization, but rather tried
to use the functionally unrelated test to persuade the court to find an "F" reorganization.
Over the vigorous dissent of Justice Pierce, who would have used "the resources of the
judicial process," id. at 164, including a form of the functionally unrelated test, id. at 166-67,
the court found no reorganization.
The argument also failed in Berghash, which also involved a service business in which the
sole shareholder of the old corporation transferred, in exchange for stock and notes, the
operating assets of the old to a new corporation owned 50-50 with one of his employees. He
then liquidated the old corporation with accumulated earnings and profits of about $125,000.
Again the Tax Court was unwilling to exclude the crucial step of injecting 50% new blood
into the new corporation. It rejected the Service's argument of an "F" reorganization on the
same ground as Gallagher, and also rejected a "D" reorganization, in part by refusing to find
§ 318-type attribution rules applicable to § 368(c).
Despite these cases, Rev. Ruling 61-156 has not been repealed. Nor have Rev. Proc. 32,
1962-2 C.B. 527 and Rev. Proc. 6, 1969-1 C.B. 396, which together say that the Service will
not rule in a reincorporation case where more than 20% of the stock of the new corporation is
owned by shareholders of the old corporation.
While cryptic, the primary issue set out in note 71 supra, includes the issue of "whether
the shift in proprietary interest at the shareholder level precludes a reorganization and
converts the termination into a liquidation." See also infra note 85.
80. 439 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971).
81. As was mentioned in supra note 23, Robert Breech seems to have been well
represented, for he also was able to use another reorganization loophole in Grubbs v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 42 (1962) to bail out accumulated earnings from another Ford dealership.
82. 439 F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 1971). See also Swanson v. United States, 479 F.2d 539, 546
(9th Cir. 1973); Berghash v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 743, 751 (1965), af'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d
Cir. 1966). Cf. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 888 (5th Cir. 1966).
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missioner8 3 did find an "F" reorganization by disregarding the old corporation's
shareholders, as compared to Revenue Ruling 61-156 in which the new share-

holders were disregarded. The essential difference between Reef and Breech
was that the Reef court was willing to use the functionally unrelated test to

impose a less-favorable tax category on the taxpayer even though both classifications, redemption and reorganization, were supported by the same economic
effects. The erosion of the less activist Breech position by later courts willing

to attribute ownership in particularly egregious cases, is a measure of the
judicial desire to stop the reincorporation device 8 4 Reef may eventually erode
the numerous cases which have refused to find a "D" reorganization where
more than 20% of new blood has been injected into the capital structuress
While most courts have refused to ignore economically significant events, the
gerrymandering approach of Revenue Ruling 61-156 here may be attractive
to other activist courts.88
83. 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966).
84. See Ringwalt v. United States, 549 F.2d 89 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 906 (1977);
Stanton v. United States, 512 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1975). See supra note 23.
85. Sea, e.g., Stanton v. United States, 512 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1975). The facts in Stanton
are a bit complicated. A sole proprietorship had elected under old Subchapter R to be taxed
as a corporation. The proprietor had repealed his election, which under the statute was to
be treated as a complete liquidation, pocketed $140,000 in retained earnings, and transferred
the operating assets into a new corporation, which in turn issued 51% of its stock to him
and (for good business reasons) 49% to his wife. The District Court below, had found the
wife's 49% new interest precluded both a "D" and an "F" reorganization, properly citing
Berghash v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966) (old drug
store corporation transfers assets to corporation with 50% new blood; see supra note 79).
Surprisingly, the Third Circuit reversed. In a poorly reasoned opinion, it echoed Arcade and
focused on the fact that immediately after the transfer, the proprietor had the right to
designate who would receive the stock, citing American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 177
F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), aft'g, 11 T.C. 397 (1948); see supra note 76. No mention was made
of the functionally unrelated test, nor of Rev. Ruling 61-156, but the result is so similar to
the Ruling's solution to the 80%-control problem that Stanton could easily be cited in
support of the Ruling on this point.
There are other analogous cases. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. United States, 568
F.2d 811 (1976) (elimination of 38% old shareholders ignored and "F" reorganization found);
Casco Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 2 (1967) (9% of old shareholders effectively disregarded as old corporation is found the same as the new corporation without benefit of any
of the reorganization provisions). Both Aetna and Casco were operating loss carryback cases.
The court in Casco attempted to limit its plastic interpretation of the Code to the facts.
Id. at 35. The Aetna court attempted to limit its interpretation to a specific Code section.
568 F.2d 811, 823-24 ("We specifically declined to decide whether classifying a reorganization
as an (F) reorganization for purposes of § 381(b)(3) would necessarily mean it is an (F) reorganization for purposes of other provisions of the Code.... Hence we consider our decision
to be far narrower than the government apprehends....').
But there are insufficient judicial standards limiting the nonrecognition of old shareholders, and therefore no reason why a hard-pressed court, perhaps citing Stanton, could not
use the functionally unrelated test to ignore new shareholders and thereby extend the reach
of the "D" reorganization provisions.
86. Professors Bittker and Eustice suggest that the "Service's Bazley.§ 301 approach (i.e.,
that the net effect of the transaction is merely a dividend distribution of corporate earnings
ratable among the continuing stockholders) may emerge as the ultimate judicial solution in
this area." B. Brrrsm & J. EUsTICE, supra note 3, at 14.54(1).
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After applying a form of the functionally unrelated test to handle the
80%-control problem, Revenue Ruling 61-156 then turned to the dividendwithin-gain problem of determining whether the cash withdrawn should be
treated as boot or as a separate 301 dividend distribution. Citing the regulations issued pursuant to the 1954 Code's legislative history, the Ruling
naturally found section 301 treatment more appropriate. The Ruling also
cited Bazley, " but did not clearly indicate whether the cash distribution was
to be treated separately from the reorganization on quasi-factual grounds, or
whether the distribution was to be treated as a dividend in accordance with
statutory purposes. While the phrasing of the issue indicated the distribution
was to be treated separately on quasi-factual grounds, the analysis in other
parts of the Ruling indicated statutory purposes were the grounds for treating
the distribution as a dividend. 88
The Service has had somewhat more success with the functionally unrelated
test in the dividend-within-gain context than in the 80%-control context. In
Davant v. Commissioner," a companion case to Reef, two vertically integrated
corporations were owned by the same shareholders. The operating assets of
one, Warehouse, were indirectly sold to the second, Water, and Warehouse
was liquidated, distributing approximately one million dollars to the shareholders. With 100% common ownership, the tax court easily found a "D" reorganization. Pursuant to section 356(a)(2), dividend treatment would
ordinarily have been limited to the $200,000 of earnings and profits of the
liquidating company, Warehouse. The Davant court held the distribution
was income to the extent of the earnings and profits of both corporations.
Relying on the two Bazley rationales, the court equated the transaction
with a section 301 distribution. As to the first Bazley rationale, a quasi-factual
separation of the distribution from the imposed reorganization, the court
found that the distributions from Warehouse to the shareholders, and from
Water to the shareholders through the purchase of Warehouse's operating
assets, were "functionally unrelated" to the reorganization, and therefore
covered by section 301.90 As to the second Bazley rationale, the naked use of
judicial power to shift categories, Davant tested funds passed to stockholders

87. Baley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947). See also supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
88. "In this case, viewing the issuance of stock of the 'purchasing' corporation to new
investors as a transaction separate from the reorganization, it is concluded that the distribution to stockholders of the 'selling' corporation . . . should be treated as a distribution under
section 301 of the Code." 1961-2 C.B. 62, 64.
Use of the primitive functionally unrelated test by Rev. Rul. 61-156 to solve the dividendwithin-gain problem takes a different tack from the test's application to the 80%-control
problem. In the dividend-within-gain solution, the Ruling views the distribution of assets,
rather than the stock issuance, as a separate event. Absent such a view, the transfer of the
operating assets and the liquidation-distribution would remain grouped together.
89. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966). See also American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204,
234 (1970) (Judge Sterret dissenting); Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144, 166 (1962)
(Judge Pierce dissenting).
90. 366 F.2d at 888-89.
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in an 'T" reorganization under section 301 standards. Thus section 301 treatment was imposed on the distributions directly, overriding section 356(a)(2). 91
Courts which have rejected this Davant approach have often adopted a
Breech-type analysis. In American Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner,9z the
Tax Court noted that the functionally unrelated test would render section
356(a)(2) superfluous in the very situation for which it was enacted.93 The
rationale of Revenue Ruling 61-156, Davant, and their judicial progeny are
simply irreconcilable with Breech and American Manufacturing.The former
seem willing to distort the language of the Code if the consequences of not
doing so appear sufficiently disastrous, while the latter seem unwilling to do
so when the events which compose the taxpayers' transactions are genuine and
economically significant.9 4 Therefore, it is apparent from these cases that both
the conditions and the consequences of the functionally unrelated test as a
judicial concept are unclear.
THE FUNCTIONALLY UNRELATED TEST AS

A METHOD OF TAx INTERPRETATION

If the contours of the functionally unrelated test emerge only hazily from
the cases which discuss it, a comparison to other methods of tax interpretation
may sharpen those contours somewhat. The following sections will examine
the functionally unrelated tests relation to the "purpose" method of interpretation, grounded on the notion that the spirit of a statute should prevail over
its letter where the spirit is clear, and its relation to the "consistency" methods
of interpretation, grounded on the judicial principle that like cases should
be treated alike.
Comparing the Functionally Unrelated
Test with Purpose Methods
Congressional purpose is one of the fundamental judicial principles underlying the functionally unrelated test. Courts sometimes use congressional
purpose to deny a taxpayer the benefits of a section with which he has literally
complied. For example, in Gregory,95 the taxpayer had literally complied with
91. Id. at 890. Under I.R.C. §§ 301(c) and 316(a) (1976), the amount of distribution is
ordinary income to the extent of the earnings and profits. The excess over the combined
earnings and profits is treated as a return of capital to the extent of the shareholders basis
in their stock, and capital gains as to any excess over the basis. I.KC. § 301(c)(2) - (3) (1976).
92. 55 T.C. 204 (1970).
93. Id. at 228.
94. The facts of American Manufacturing lend some credence to this distinction since,
like Davant, the case involved two wholly~owned corporations. The operating assets of the
first subsidiary were transferred to the second, and then the first was liquidated up into the
parent corporation. It is also possible to argue, however, that Davant and American Manufacturing can be distinguished on the grounds that Davant involved transfers between individual shareholders and their corporations, while American Manufacturing involved es-

sentially inter-corporate transfers, which are more appropriate transactions for applying
§ 356(a)(2) (1976).
95. 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (shareholder-taxpayer must comply with purpose behind "E"
reorganization as well as its literal requirements).
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the reorganization provisions in order to effectuate a divisive bailout, but the
Court denied her the benefits of these provisions." However, congressional
purpose as used in Davant and Reef to justify the functionally unrelated test,
is distinct from its traditional use in other tax areas. 97 Here, the functionally
unrelated test invokes congressional purpose to impose a code section upon
the taxpayer with which he does not literally comply rather than deny him
the benefits of one with which he does literally comply. Under that rationale,
the service in Revenue Ruling 61-156 employed congressional purpose to
impose "dividend taxation" upon the taxpayer and to deny the benefits of
section 337. 95

While the cases employing the functionally unrelated test are fairly easily
distinguished from the line of cases using the traditional denial-because-of-purpose approach, they are less easily distinguished from the well-accepted line of
reincorporation cases imposing "D" reorganizations. Still, it is possible to find
differences. First, in the ordinary "D"-imposing reincorporation cases, congressional purpose is given effect only when the taxpayer has structured a
convoluted paper transaction, not when there is economic substance to each
of the steps. Second, the traditional reincorporation cases expand the statutory
language by selectively extending or contracting individual words or clauses,
while the functionally unrelated test rides roughshod over the words of the
statute and superimposes a different judicial scheme by reference to the
statute's overall purpose. Revenue Ruling 61-156, Davant, and Reef, the
principal authorities for the functionally unrelated test, all appear to take
this approach. Not coincidentally, both Davant and Reef either quoted or cited
Holmes:
The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law
shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will
should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise of the conclusion
expressed in the statute, the change of policy that induces the enactment,
may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty
for courts to say: "we see what you are driving at, but you have not said
it, and therefore we shall go on as before."9 9
Davant then went on to override the words of the statute in a number of important, even startling ways. 1n Reef, the use of the functionally unrelated test
96. Id. at 470. The business purpose doctrine of Gregory actually represents a specialized
form of the denial-because-of-purpose doctrine. Unless a transaction has a business purpose,
the doctrine denies the benefits of a Code section intended to benefit business transactions.
In the reincorporation area, the courts have "taken the task of policing this tax-free corridor."
S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, 2 FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 634 (1973).

97. Congressional purpose is typically used to deny the taxpayer the benefits of a section
with which he literally complies. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (denial of
"E" reorganization); Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 583 (1938)

(denial of re-

organization benefit); Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947) (arguably denial of "E"
reorganization). See also Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (denial of
capital gain treatment).

98.

1961-2 C.B. 62, 65.

99. Johnson v. United States, 163 F.2d 30, 32 (Ist Cir. 1908) (cited by Davant, 366 F.2d at

886, and quoted by Reef, 368 F.2d at 137).
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as a means of adjusting the statute to carry out congressional purpose was
even more explicit.100
Comparing the Functionally Unrelated
Test with Consistency Methods
of Interpretation
Treating like cases alike, i.e., consistently, is a second fundamental judicial
principle. In the tax law, there are two main "consistency" methods of tax
interpretation: substance-over-form and step-transactions. In general, the substance-over-form doctrine is used to shift a transaction to a much more appropriate classification. For example, in Helvering v. Clifford,'0 ' there were
two possible owners of certain trust property; the trust itself and the grantor.
Because the trust was riddled with retained interests and powers, the court
imposed ownership on the grantor. While reposing trust property ownership in the trust was not inappropriate, 0 2 imposing it upon the grantor was
much more appropriate. The court thus applied the substance-over-form
doctrine to change the tax classification from a less appropriate category to
a more appropriate one.
The functionally unrelated test is clearly similar to this substance-over-form
doctrine because it also changes tax classifications. 103 Despite this similarity,
100. Reef Co. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125, 134 (5th Cir. 1966).
101. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
102. See 309 U.S. at 343' (Roberts, J. & McReynolds, J. dissenting). Cf. Casner, Estate '
Gift Tax Changes, 103 Ta. & EST. 932 (1964) (Professor Casner demonstrates that a person's
powers and interests in a trust can be virtually equivalent to his actual ownership of the
trust property).
103. In the case of the 80%-control problem, the suggested alternate category is a -D"
or "F" reorganization, followed by the introduction of new shareholders. See Rev. Rul. 156,
1961-2 C.B. 62 (new 55% public shareholders disregarded). See also Reef. Co. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966) (Service's position that buy-out of old shareholders
found functionally unrelated; "F" reorganization appropriate); Berghash v. Commissioner, 43
T.C. 743, 756 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966) (Service unsuccessfully argues new
50% shareholder should be disregarded); Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144, 157 n.12 &
*166 (1962) (Service unsuccessfully argues 28% of new shareholders should be disregarded).
The general use of a "D" reorganization to deny liquidation treatment in reincorporation
cases employs this substance-over-form concept. The shareholder's casting of the transaction
as a liquidation followed by a reincorporation (or sale and distribution), while not inappropriate, nevertheless is a weakly appropriate classification compared to the "D" reorganization
classification, which seems strongly appropriate. See B. BiTteR & J. EusricF, supra note 3,
at 14-156 to -157.
As for the dividend-within-gain problem, the suggested category is that of simple dividend.
See Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947), ("E" reorganization denied); Nicholson,
supra note 14, at A-14. The Bazley court analogized the $400,000 bond distribution to the
dividend classification the court deemed appropriate: "No doubt, if the Bazley corporation
had issued the bonds to Barley and his wife without any recapitalization, it would have
made a taxable distribution, instead, these debentures were issued as a part of a family
arrangement, the only additional element being of an unrelated modification of the capital
account. The debentures were found to be worth at least their principal amount, and they
were virtually cash because they were callable at the will of the corporation, which in this
case was the call of the taxpayer." 331 U.S. at 742.
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those cases in which the Service has applied the functionally unrelated test
are distinguishable from those in which the substance-over-form doctrine is
ordinarily applied. The most important distinction is the relative appropriateness of the competing categories. In the substance-over-form cases, the change
is usually from a less appropriate classification to a more appropriate one,
whereas in the functionally unrelated test cases, a judicial choice is often made
04
between two more or less equally appropriate classifications.
The functionally unrelated test also bears a strong relationship to the
second "consistency" method of interpretation: the step-transactions doctrine.
The step-transactions doctrine is a way of selecting from a series of events
those that should be aggregated for tax classification purposes. The more
common of its two forms is used to aggregate two or more temporally-unrelated
events by using the teleological end of both.' 05 The less common exclusionary
form is used to disregard a temporally-related step in what appears to be the
same transaction, which is unrelated to the achievement of a particular end
the other steps contemplated. For example, in Minnesota Tea' 0 6 the court
ignored transfers made to the shareholders for payment of corporate debts that
0 7
were unnecessary to the objective of paying those debts.
104. As indicated, the series of transactions in an ordinary liquidation-reincorporation
case could thus be characterized as either a liquidation or a "D" reorganization. The traditional line of reincorporation cases found the latter category clearly more appropriate when
80% or more of the shareholders of the old corporation become shareholders in the new
corporation. See supra note 103. With less than 80%, however, the relative appropriateness
of the categories becomes a closer question. For example, in Revenue Ruling 61-156 it is by
no means clear that a transaction where only 45% continue is more appropriately classified
as a "D" reorganization than as a liquidation. As to the dividend-within-gain problem,
§ 356(a)(2) is at least as appropriate as § 301. See supra text accompanying note 93.
Another, less important distinction between the functionally unrelated test concept
and the substance-over-form doctrine is that the functionally unrelated test is used to reclassify the attributes of corporations. The substance-over-form doctrine is rarely so used,
for the corporate form has alway,. had a special status in tax law. Even in Gregory, from the
Board of Tax Appeals through the Supreme Court, the Service's argument that the corporation should be disregarded as a "sham" was explicitly rejected, although the courts seem
more willing to lift the corporate veil in self-dealing cases. See, e.g., Bazley v. Commissioner,
331 U.S. 737 (1947) ("E" reorganization denied). See generally Bittker, Pervasive Judicial
Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal Revenue Code, 21 How. L.J. 693, 703-13 (1978)
(general discussion of two formal ways of achieving a single economic result).
105. "Teleological end" used in this sense is ambiguous. It could mean the subjective
goal of the taxpayer. Compare the requirement of a "plan" in I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(D) and
354(a)(2) (1976). See Mathis v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1123 (1953), acq. 1953-02 C.B. 5. Conversely, it could mean the common economic goal which all, and only all, of the events (or
"steps") produce. Another way of expressing this latter idea is to ask whether "on a reasonable interpretation of objective facts the steps were so interdependent that . . . one transaction would have been fruitless without a completion of the series." Paul & Zimet, supra note
75, at 254.
106. 302 U.S. 609 (1935).
107. Revenue Ruling 61-156 is similar to this second, exclusionary form of the step
transaction doctrine. 1961-2 C.B. 62, 63. ("The issuance of stock to new investors can be
disregarded as being a separate transaction, since even without it, the dominant purpose- to
withdraw corporate earnings while continuing the equity interests in substantial part in a
business enterprise conducted in corporate form.- was fully achieved. The issuance of stock
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The functionally unrelated test differs from the step-transactions doctrine
in two respects. First, as traditionally applied, the step-transactions doctrine's
exclusionary form excludes only steps with little or no economic effect. In
Minnesota Tea, the distribution of cash to the shareholders for payment to
the creditors, which had little independent economic effect, was disregarded.
Similarly, in the traditional reincorporation cases, receipt of operating assets
by shareholders is disregarded when these assets are immediately put back into
a new corporation.? s On the other hand, the steps in the reincorporation cases
the functionally unrelated test attempts to disregard, the introduction of new
shareholders or the distribution of excess cash, do frequently have significant
economic effect.
The second distinction is that while the step-transactions doctrine may use
the common economic goal as a way to determine which events to include or
exclude in considering a transaction, the functionally unrelated test may use
the tax-avoidance motive to gerrymander these events. Although never made
explicit, Revenue Ruling 61-156, as well as the Davant and Reef opinions
hint that the shareholders' tax avoidance motive is one reason to gerrymander
the temporally-related steps into two functional groups. 109 This seems tantamount to using the taxpayer's tax avoidance motive to classify the transactions,
- 0
a principle which courts have rejected since before Gregory."
THE FUNCTIONALLY UNRELATED TEST
AS A JUDICIAL CONCEPT

After comparison with other methods of tax interpretation, the functionally
unrelated test's contours may be more defined, but the concept is still not in
to new investors was not needed to implement the dominant purpose, and, therefore, the
rest of the transaction was not fruitless without it and so dependent on it.").
108. See also supra note 20 (Davant and Reef disregarded strawman transfers). Also,
sometimes economically insignificant events are effectively supplied. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 354(a)(1)
(1976) (a stock-for-stock exchange, which is disregarded in imposing a "D" reorganization,
since to request issuance of new stock to present stockholders would be to require a "meaningless" act. See also Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966); James Armour, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295, 307 (1964); Moffatt v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 558, 578 (1964),
afJ'd, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1966).
109. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 882 (5th Cir. 1966) ("Petitioners make no
attempt to provide a nontax-avoidance purpose for their actions .. ");Reef Co. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1966) (where the hints are submerged in a conclusionary
discussion of Congressional purpose).
110. Bittker, supra note 104, at 699. But see Paul, Motive and Intent in Federal Tax
Law, in SLETe STrums IN FEDERAL TAXATION, supra note 75, at 255. Compare Pridenmark,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35, 41 (4th Cir. 1965) (,the facts of this case do not bring it
within the -reincorporation area because the transactions were not motivated by a desire to
avoid the payment of taxes") with Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 86, 98 (1978),
aff'd, 614 F.2d 860, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980) (tax motive ifrelevant in imposing "D"

reorganization).
The major argument for rejecting tax motive as a criterion appears to be the inherent
uncertainty of using non-objective events to classify a transaction. See Cohen, Tax Avoidance
Purposes as a Statutory Test in Tax Legislation, 1960 Tm.. TAX INST. 229 (criticizing the use
of motive as a criterion of tax consequences in statutory enactments).
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sharp focus. In order to understand a judicial concept like the functionally
unrelated test, one must generally know both the conditions under which
the concept will be applied, and the consequences of its application. On its
narrowest reading, the functionally unrelated test separates events for tax
classification. These events, appropriately gerrymandered, fit into the reorganization rather than the liquidation definitions, thereby solving the 80%,control problem. In addition, they fit into section 301 rather than section
356(a)(2), thereby solving the dividend-within-gain problem.
On a more abstract level, the functionally unrelated test provides a way
of harmonizing the tax consequences of various formal paths within Subchapter C by which shareholders can reach a given economic goal. Presumably,
shareholders could be denied the benefits of the reincorporation device when
as few as 50% continue into the new corporation, and in all appropriate cases
could also be required to pay tax at ordinary-income rates on the cash they
withdraw."" This would help harmonize the tax consequences of the
reincorporation device with similar transactions that fall under sections 304
and 302.112
111. Under Rev. Rul. 541, 1956-2 C.B. 189, the Service found a "complete liquidation"
for purposes of §§ 331 and 337 with all the attendant benefits of the reincorporation device,
where 45% of the new corporation's shareholders were also shareholders of the old corporation.
In the late 1950's it was underslood that if 50% or more of the shareholders of the old
corporation continued into the new, the Service would take the position that there was no
"complete liquidation," at least not for purposes of § 337. McLean, Problems of Reincorporation and Related Proposals of the Subchapter C Advisory Group, 13 TAX L. REv. 407, 430
(1958). All this went by the boards in 1961 with Rev. Rul. 156, 1961-2 C.B. 62, when the
Service revoked Rev. Rul. 56-541 and used the functionally unrelated test concept to deny
reincorporation benefits even when the percentage of continuing shareholders fell below 50%.
The Service now refuses to rule on transactions where the old shareholders hold more
than 20% by value of the shares of the new corporation. Rev. Proc. 32, 1962-2 C.B. 527 and
Rev. Proc. 6, 1969-1 C.B. 396. Thus, if the Service's ruling position were accepted, reincorporation benefits could be denied when as few as 20% continued. Since these percentages are
only judicial standards, there is no magic to any of them, although it might be argued that
with less than 51% the continuing shareholders would not have voting control of the new
corporation for purposes of determining continuity of interest at the shareholder level. Even
this is not an adequate standard; the continuing shareholders might have effective control
with only 45%. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 61-156 (where the new 55% shareholders were public
shareholders). See also John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1936) (adequate continuity of interest for reorganization purposes where continuing shareholders received nonvoting preferred shares).
112. The equivalent threshold for denial of reincorporation-type benefits under I.R.C.
§ 304 is 50% of either the voting power or the value of all shares. I.R.C. § 304(c)(2) (1976).
Furthermore, the constructive ownership provisions of I.R.C. § 318 apply. (This is a major
stumbling block in solving the reincorporation 80%-control problem.) See supra note 23.
I.R.C. § 304 is intended to stop another type of bailout device. Suppose that A owns 100
shares (50%) each of the 200 shares of corporation X and of corporation Y. If he sells
30 of his 100 shares of corporation X (basis $10,000) to corporation Y for $50,000, he might
claim a capital gain of $40,000, essentially bailing out earnings and profits of corporation Y,
even though he continues to control all of the shares of corporation X through his ownership of corporation L. See Treas. Reg. § 1.304-2(c) Example (1) T.D. 6969, 1968 2 C.B. 128.
I.R.C. § 301 denies these benefits by attributing one-half of corporation Y's new X shares
to A, under I.R.C. §§ 304(c)(2) and 318(a), and then determines that I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(c) is not
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On a still more abstract level the test may be seen as a grant of power,
allowing the Service to reclassify a taxpayer's transaction and shift it from the
taxpayer's chosen category to a less-favorable one. So viewed, the functionally
unrelated test, like the old canons of interpretation, is a method of reaching
certain reasonable objectives, and not a reason for reaching these objectives.
As Professor Bittker repeatedly notes in his discussion of such methods, they
cannot be used to predict the outcome of particular cases; rather, they establish
a "climate within which decisions are made." 1 3
The functionally unrelated test thus is not, at base, a mechanical rule at all.
When the trappings are stripped away, the test simply reduces to an expression
of the second Bazley rationale. In reincorporation cases, where the call of
congressional purpose is strong and the pressure for consistency is great, categories will be switched. That portion of the functionally unrelated test which
reaches the same result by "interpreting" facts under the first Bazley rationale
is simply window-dressing.
Understanding this, one might ask whether tax classifications should be
changed by such a judicial technique to solve the 80%-control and dividendwithin-gain problems. Two fundamental principles bearing on the question
have been identified: the purpose principle, that courts should carry out
congressional purpose, and the consistency principle, that like cases should
be treated alike. The next portion of the article suggests that neither of these
principles is sufficient to justify using the functionally unrelated test to stop
the reincorporation device.
Analysis of CongressionalPurposeas a
GeneralJustificationof the
Functionally Unrelated Test
Revenue Ruling 61-156, Davant, Reef and a number of dissenting remet as to A's ownership of corporation X, and the entire $50,000 is a distribution under
§ 801. See generally B. Brrr. &J.EusicE, supra note 3,at 1I[ 9.30-.32.
A number of things should be emphasized. First, the bail-out is denied if A's stock ownership in corporations X and Y is 50%, not 80% as under I.R.C. § 368(c). Second, the redemption
is measured by reference to A's ownership in X corporation (the stock of which he sold to
corporation Y). Third, the distribution is treated as ordinary income to the extent of the
earnings and profits of corporation Y (to which the shares of corporation X were sold). It is
not limited to the gain realized on the sale.
If A and the other shareholders of X corporation had sold all their shares to corporation

Y, ordinary income consequences of the distribution would be limited by the earnings and
profits of corporation Y, the new corporation. On the other hand, if corporation X were
liquidated and the assets transferred to corporation Y in a straightforward reincorporation

case where "D"reorganization treatment is imposed, the ordinary-income treatment would
be limited by the earnings and profits of the corporation X, the old corporation. In neither
case are the earnings and profits of both corporations expressly used.

113. Bittker, supra note 104, at 695. See also id. at 705-06; Chirelstein, supra note 44, at
440: "The courts themselves follow not single and consistent set of rules in deciding when

to accept and when to disregard the taxpayer's choice of form .. " Cf. Llewellyn, Remarks on
the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be
Construed, 2 VAND. L. REv. 895 (1950) (table of opposing canons of construction on each
point of construction).
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incorporation opinions rely on congressional authority to partially justify
their use of the functionally unrelated test. 114 Congressional authority may be
statutorily delegated" 5 or contained in the legislative history. Absent explicit
statutory delegation in the reincorporation area, the Service and the courts
have been forced to rely on ambiguous legislative history.11 6 Using the statement of the managers on the part of the House that "the [reincorporation
problem] can appropriately be disposed of by judicial decision or by regulation
within the framework of other provisions of the bill,"" 7 some courts have felt
justified in creatively interpreting the Code." 8 It is not clear, however, what
weight should be given to a bare statement by the "managers on the part of
the House."" 9 Revenue Ruling 61-156, Davant, and Reef fail to cite it. Moreover, other courts have taken note of congressional failure to pass a proposed
reincorporation section and have declined to enact a section through interpreta0
tion that Congress has apparently rejected.12
The Davant and Reef courts may have been influenced by the general
hostility Congress has traditionally expressed toward bailout schemes, a
hostility expressed in many congressional attempts to foil such schemes. In
Davant, the taxpayers argued that courts usually interpret the Code literally,
leaving it to Congress to amend the Code if necessary. In response, the Davant
court noted that if the courts had done their job, perhaps Congress would not
121
have had to act to stem these bailout schemes.
Davant did not focus clearly on the distinction between a congressional
action, which can be limited and ultimately becomes part of the Code for the
taxpayer or counselor to read, and a judicial response, which is more difficult
to ascertain. Judicially closed loopholes have often been sealed shut by subsequent congressional action. For example, Clifford no longer has further direct
application to trusts because Congress reintroduced statutory precision in that
area." 2 Such congressional reaction may be read as an expression of the
importance Congress places on obvious, well-defined tax categories.
Other arguments are also inconclusive. The fact that Congress has failed
114. Reef Co. v. Commissioner, 868 F.2d, 125, 184 et. seq. (5th Cir. 1966); Davant v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966); Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 420, 451
(1970) (Judge Tannenwald dissenting from finding of no reorganization); Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144, 165 (1962) Judge Pierce dissenting from finding of no reorganization);
Rev. Rul. 156, 1961-2a C.B. 62, 65.
115. Cf. I.R.C. § 885; Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.385 (1980).
116. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 61.
118. The explicit reference to this authority has appeared only in dicta or in dissenting
opinions. Pridemark, Inc., 815 F.2d at 41 (4th Cir. 1965) (dicta); Estate of Lammerts, 54 T.C.
at 451 (1970) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting); Gallagher, 89 T.C. at 146 (1962) (Pierce, J.,
dissenting).
119. See supra note 61.
120. Since these facts do not fall within the careful language of those sections, the
distributions should be treated as payment in exchange for the stock. To find differently
would be to enact that provision which has failed on two separate occasions to be enacted
by Congress. Gallagher v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 144, 168 (1962). See infra note 169.
121. Davant v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 874, 887 n.27 (5th Cir. 1966).
122. See I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (1976).
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to act against the reincorporation device, after nearly thirty years of opportunity, allows both taxpayers and the Service to argue that legislative history
is in their favor.123 Also, the House managers' statement 124 is undercut by the
history of section 356(a)(2). An example in the 1924 House committee report
attached to section 356 described the reincorporation device exactly, and clearly
established the applicability of 356(a)(2) to this situation125 The Davant court's
answer to the dividend-within-gain problem, however, seems to ignore section
356(a)(2) and apply section 301 dividend treatment on the grounds of statutory
purpose, although perhaps the Bazley-301 solution need only apply in certain
cases. It may make sense to apply section 301 in self-dealing cases, while using
section 356(a)(2) where management and ownership are separate or when there
is an economic shift within the corporation's capital structure.
Even if the congressional delegation of power was manifest, that delegation
should not be judicially accepted until Congress provides adequate direction
to guide its exercise. Of minor concern is the question of to whom the power
has been delegated. Legislative history suggests that the delegation, if any, is
to the Service and the courts jointly. 26 More important is the ambiguous scope
of the delegated power. Even if Congress has clearly delegated the power to
stop "bailouts," it has not defined what constitutes a "bailout." 2 7 The term
is not self-defining, and the unresolved policy cross-currents provide courts
123. For example, it is also possible to argue that Congressional inaction indicates a
disenchantment with the double-tax model of corporate taxation. See Surrey, Reflections on
the Revenue Act of 1978 and Future Tax Policy, 13 GA. L. Rmv. 687 (1979) concerning the

recent history of the full-integration movement. The expansion of the Subchapter S provisions might also be seen as a partial attack on the double-tax system, as could the repeal
of I.R.C. § 1023 (carry-over basis at death), which is clearly beneficial to closely-held corporations when coupled with the limitation of "boot" to the gain on liquidation. See supra notes
17, 21, 54 & 55.
124. There is at least some suspicion that the "managers on the part of the House"
inserted the statement that the problem could be resolved by judicial action in part to
counter the inference that the reincorporation loophole was available to taxpayers since
Congress had failed to pass the proposed section dealing with it. See Nicholson, supra note 14,
at A-6 to A-7. The problem this raises in the reincorporation cases, and the more general
problem of ambiguity of congressional direction, is discussed by a foreign observer in R. DuAS,
JuRIsPRuDENcE 237 (1976).
125. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1924) (accompanying H.R. REP.
No. 6715).
"Corporation A has capital stock of $100,000, and earnings and profits accumulated since
March 1, 1913, of $50,000. If it distributes the $50,000 as a dividend to its stockholders, the
amount distributed .will be taxed at the full surtax rates. On the other hand, corporation A
may organize corporation B, to which it transfers all its assets, the consideration for the
transfer being the issuance by B of all its stock and $50,000 in cash to the stockholders of
corporation A in exchange for their stock in corporation A. Under the existing law, the
$50,000 distributed with the stock of corporation B would be taxed, not as a dividend, but
as a capital gain. . . .The effect of such a distribution is obviously the same as if the
corporation had cleared out as a dividend its $50,000 earnings and profits. If dividends are
to be subject to the full surtax rates, then such an amount so distributed should also be
subject to the surtax taxes and not to the 12 percent rate on capital gain. Here again this
provision prevents evasions."
126. See supra text accompanying notes 70 & 71.
127.

See supra note 29.
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with little guidance. Guidance is necessary to apply judicial standards to the
proper classification of reincorporation cases. Absent such guidance, courts
should abandon the effort to restructure the Code in this area, whether through
the functionally unrelated test or other means.
Consistency as a GeneralJustification
Of the Functionally Unrelated Test
Without further legislative action, courts can choose either to read the
Code literally and allow taxpayers the benefits of the reincorporation device,
or they can use flexible interpretation to deny these benefits. While both
flexible judicial interpretation of the Code and legislative amendment of the
Code have the goal of stopping the reincorporation device, judicial interpretation is costlier. Judicial action, unlike legislative action, weakens the federal
income tax system. Most importantly, it weakens self-assessment, a key ingredient in the success of the tax system. 28 Self-assessment requires that the
taxpayer both be able to compute his tax and be willing to pay it. The taxpayer should be guided in computing his taxes by obvious, well-defined categories and the tax system's fairness should encourage him to pay them.
Obvious categories, one aid to self-assessment, clearly suffer at the hands
of flexible judicial interpretation. One of the most undesirable consequences
of the functionally unrelated test is that it distorts the Code's logical structure. If certain events are shaped into non-obvious groupings, it becomes more
difficult to determine tax results by fitting the facts into the corresponding
definitional categories. The self-assessment feature of the federal income tax
system is accordingly weakened. Unsophisticated taxpayers relying on the obvious formal classifications may be trapped and sophisticated taxpayers may
come to suspect the Code's otherwise obvious classifications. Even after examining Revenue Ruling 61-156 and the cases in which the functionally unrelated
test is used, predicting what circumstances will trigger application of the test
remains difficult. For example, solving the 80%-control problem will leave the
taxpayer unsure what percentage is enough to impose a reorganization and
deny him his bailout; solving the dividend-within-gain problem, while preserving a role for section 356(a)(2), will leave the taxpayer unsure which section,
356(a)(2) or 301, will be applied.
It might be argued, however, that the categories should be less obvious in
the reincorporation area, providing a sort of in terrorum effect to deter overreaching taxpayers from taking advantage of the system. 129 Such an effect is
used elsewhere in tax administration. For example, fear of audits may keep
many taxpayers honest. It might also be argued that few taxpayers actually
read the Code, particularly in the reorganization area where they are much
more likely to rely on tax counselors. The price of counsel may increase with
the difficulties of ascertaining the law, but this might be viewed either as a
sort of excise tax on reorganizations or, by a cynic, as a subsidy to tax
counselors.
128.

This argument is not new. See Underwood, Form and Substance in Tax Cases, 16

VA. L. REv. 327, 341-42 (1930).

129.

Bittker, supra note 104, at 695-96.
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While telling, neither of these arguments is persuasive. The argument that
an in terorum effect should be used assumes that those cases where taxpayers
are "taking advantage" are distinguishable from those where they are not. If
the policy guidelines in the area were clear, and the distinctions easy, however,
Congress could simply amend the Code to solve the problem. In addition, the
stakes are often sufficiently high that threats of an audit may not deter the
use of the reincorporation device. The argument that that counsel can be used
in the reincorporation area, and therefore that obvious categories are not
necessary, assumes the functionally unrelated test will be selectively used to
stop the reincorporation device. While it is easy to use a legislative amendment surgically and precisely, it is more difficult to confine the judicial power.
Other flexible methods of tax interpretation such as substance-over-form, steptransactions, and business purpose, have migrated freely into areas quite
separate from those in which they were first used. The fact that such techniques
tend to migrate slowly would be of little help since counselors would have no
way of knowing whether their client's case would be the first application of the
technique outside the reincorporation area. Economy, a central benefit of selfassessment, would suffer.' -0
Well-defined categories, another aid to self-assessment, are also affected by
flexible judicial interpretation. A central reason for having well-defined categories is the natural inclination of the taxpayer, and perhaps the ethical
obligation of his counsel,331 to stretch the interpretation as far as possible in
the taxpayer's favor. If loopholes are inevitable in a complex statute, a multitude of new loopholes could be opened by the cumulative effect of these
flexible interpretations in the hands of sophisticated tax counsel. Such a result
is clearly undesirable.
One way of allowing the government to use flexible interpretation while
refusing its use to taxpayers is to impose a double standard, allowing flexible
interpretation only, or mostly, in the government's favor. In fact, this approach
is evident in the overall federal income tax system. The definition of "gross
income," which normally favors the government, is expansively interpreted.
Exemptions and deductions, which normally favor the taxpayer, are narrowly
interpreted.132 In those cases where the taxpayer wants "D" reorganization
treatment, he must meet both the letter and the purpose of the statutory
language in order to succeed. 33 In the reincorporation cases, however, where
130. Some of the force is taken out of this argument by the fact that the Service has
announced its position in the reincorporation area. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.301-1(1) & 1.331-1(c)
(1960); Rev. Rul. 156, 1961-2 C.B. 62. Precisely when the Service will press its claim may not
be clear, but it has adequately announced its intention to do so in the reincorporation area.
131. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSMttury, DR 7-101(A) (1979) (provides in relevant
part: "'A lawyer shall not intentionally . . . (1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his
client.
').
). See also id. EC 7-3 ("While serving as advocate, a lawyer should resolve in
favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law.").
132. See cases collected in 1 M RTNs LAW OF FEDERAL INCOMEi TAXATION §3.07.
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2a (1960) ("The application of the term 'reorganization' is to be

strictly limited to the specific transactions set forth in section 368(a)"). See, e.g., American
Potash 9: Chem. Co. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 200 (Ct. Cl. 1968). Occasionally, this
double standard is made explicit, as in Moffat v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 262, 267 n.1 (9th
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the taxpayer is attempting to avoid reorganization treatment, the section's
literal language is often disregarded.13
There are two major objections to this double standard. First, it creates
two different bodies of law with respect to the same statutory provision, thereby
doubling the already complex nature of the Code and the expense of its
exigesis. Second, and more importantly, the double standard may affect the
taxpayer's perception of the tax system's basic fairness. The taxpayer might
think it unfair to allow the government to interpret either the statutory
language or the facts flexibly without according him the same privilege. 13 5 In
Estate of Stauffer v. Commissioner,16 the court voiced this sense of unfairness
in meeting the Service's argument that an "F" reorganization could be broadly
interpreted for stopping the reincorporation device in Davant, but not for
-llowing the taxpayer a net operating loss carryback.
in effect, [the Service] says that a 'F' reorganization is one thing when
the issue is treatment of gain and another when the issue is loss carryback .... We do not see how the definitive principles of an 'F' organization can change from one case to another, from one context to another, dependent upon which position the [Service] prefers .... An 'F'
reorganization is just that, 3 and
tax consequences flow from that de7
termination, not vice versa.1
Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1966), where the court was discussing the term "substantially all" in a reincorporation case: "Both cases [cited by the taxpayer] involved a
situation where the taxpayer had to show a 'transfer of substantially all' assets in order to
avoid tax. Thus a different standard of construction applies than here, where 'capital gain
provisions are an exception to the ordinary treatment accorded most income [and must
therefore] be strictly construed.'" (emphasis in the original).
134. B. BITTER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 14.54(1). But see Swanson v. United States,
479 F.2d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding no plan to reincorporate and holding this fatal
to the imposition of a "D" reorganization because the statutory requirements must be precisely met).
135. Part of the dilemma in the reincorporation area is caused by the initial decision
under the pre-1954 Code to use the "D" reorganization provisions to stop the reincorporation device. This created a statutory provision with two different purposes. The problem of
a double standard is less acute in other areas where flexible methods of interpretation are
applied. A Code section may have been flexibly interpreted, to be sure, but it is flexibly
interpreted in the same circumstances for both the Service and the taxpayer. For example,
taxpayers have been able to use Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955)
(denial of capital gains treatment) to support their position when it is favorable to them.
Kurdin v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 958 (1956), acq. 1957-1 C.B. 4 (ordinary rather than capital
losses allowed). Taxpayers have also had success in arguing the flexible methods of interpretation in their favor under Subchapter C. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner,
187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951) (purchase of stock treated as
purchase of assets) is perhaps the best example. See also Rosen, Substance Over Form - A
Taxpayer's Weapon, 1970 CAL. "]'AX'N INST. 689; Donaldson, When Substance-Over-Form
Argument is Available to the Taxpayer, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 41 (1964).
136. 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968) (taxpayer allowed to combine corporations in "F" reorganization for the purposes of operating loss carryback).
137. Id. at 619. See also Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144, 162 (1962) (rejecting argument that "F" reorganization should be applied where 38% of old blood eliminated from the
new corporation and 28% of new blood introduced); Love v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 172,
178 (1939) (can not include some essential steps and exclude others); Tuner Advertising
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Stepping back from the functionally unrelated test as a method of interpretation, one might reasonably ask why these arguments about obvious, welldefined categories and a fair system do not also apply to other well-accepted
interpretive devices such as substance-over-form, step-transactions, and the
contorted interpretation of the "D" reorganization. The answer, of course, is
that the arguments do apply." 8 The goal of obvious, well-defined categories
suffers under each, particularly in the traditional line of "D" reorganization
cases. Perhaps the difference lies in the fact that these cases, even the contorted
"D" line, either transfer from a wealy appropriate category to more strongly
appropriate, or they disregard economically meaningless events.1 39 The
functionally unrelated test, however, often shifts economically meaningful
events from one appropriate classification to another more-or-less equally
appropriate one, and in so doing, invades what taxpayers likely view as a
safe-harbor. A taxpayer should feel safe in choosing one appropriate classifica1 40
tion over another if his transaction has some economic meaning.
of Ky. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 532 (1966) (same), Lipkind, Gallagher Revisited:
The Functionally Unrelated CorporateReorganization, 13 ViLL. L. R V. 487, 626 (1968). Reef
Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 379, 391 (1965) was reversed on this point. 368 F.2d
125, 134 (5th Cir. 1966) (using functionally unrelated test).
Nor should one lose sight of fairness to other taxpayers in the system. On a horizontal
level the basic goal of consistency can be recast as a fairness argument. It seems unfair to
allow one taxpayer, perhaps better-advised or more aggressive, to win the benefits of the
reincorporation device, while others similarly placed do not. On the vertical level, it may seem
unfair to allow a taxpayer to avoid paying his proper share of taxes without either surrendering an appropriate part of his ownership in the company (through sale of stock)
or giving up his ability to carry on business in the corporate form through liquidation. Undoubtedly, at least some of the problems in this complicated area are caused by the binary
"all-or-nothing" nature of the federal income taxation system. Perhaps in no other area
does the fluid nature of the transactions presenting themselves for classification contrast so
starkly with the rigid nature of the classification to which they must be assigned.
138. See, e.g., Note, The UnpleasantTaste of Corn Products,53 S. CAL. L. Rv. 311 (1979)
(where the author decries the uncertainty of the Corn Products doctrine, and in particular
the unsatisfactory nature of the taxpayer motive used as a criterion of classification).
189. See supra note 108.
140. Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954) (redemption allowed in a nonreincorporation case where taxpayer actually had sold out); Berghash v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.
743, 749 (1965), aff'd, 861 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966) (rejecting, because transaction had economic
substance, Service's argument that transfer to new corporation with 50% new blood was a
sham or a reorganization).
Another line of reasoning which has not yet been discussed might be mentioned conveniently here. Davant and Reef have in common with the more accepted line of "D" reorganization cases, and with the other methods of flexible interpretation, the assumption
that judicial action is appropriate. In part, this is an assumption about the division of
responsibility between Congress and the courts. Every mature legal system has judicial
adjusters, but it will be remembered that one distinction between Davant and the more
traditional cases was that Davant approached the interpretation problem in a macro-sense,
taking as its task, "harmonizing these apparently divergent [Code] elements of specific tax
policy so that they may continue to cohabit the same body of general law which Congress
has directed shall be viewed as a single plan." 366 F.2d at 879. This approach is clearly
manifested later in Davant where the court stated: "where there is a complete identity of
shareholders and their proprietary interest, as here, we hold that the type of transaction
involved is a type (F) reorganization." Id. at 884. This general approach, is undoubtedly
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Proprietyof the Functionally Unrelated Test
as the ProperForm of JudicialResponse
Assuming arguendo that the courts should act to stop the reincorporation
device without waiting for a proper legislative amendment, the functionally
unrelated test's propriety as a form of such action must also be addressed.
The following discussion will examine three arguments directed against the
functionally unrelated test as a form of judicial action. First, that the functionally unrelated test improperly uses the taxpayer's tax-avoidance motive to
classify his transactions; second that the functionally unrelated test appears
to be a factual finding and, as such, vests too much unreviewable power in the
trial court; and third, that the functionally unrelated test is too powerful an
interpretive method in general. The discussion will then turn to whether
the functionally unrelated test is a more appropriate response than other
possible judicial solutions.
Three Arguments Against the Functionally
Unrelated Test as a Form of JudicialAction
The first argument is that the functionally unrelated test uses the taxpayer's
tax avoidance motive to classify his transactions. When the functionally unrelated test is used, the taxpayer's purpose in structuring his transaction is
examined. In using this "fruitfulness" or "functional" test, Revenue Ruling
61-156 and the cases seem to skate close to utilizing the shareholders' taxavoidance motives to separate economic events;1 41 yet a taxpayer's specific tax
avoidance motive has long been rejected as a factor in categorizing economic
events for tax purposes. 142 Among the more important reasons for this rejection
is that in a self-assessing system the subjective motive of the taxpayer is not
easily discernable. 143 There are, however, two responses to this first objection,
and they parallel the two Bazley readings contained in the dividend-withingain portion of Revenue Ruling 61-156.
improper, as courts generally lack adequate technical expertise or political input to make
these kinds of decisions. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 110-15 (1977). But see

Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: "The Middle
Road:" 1, 40 TEx. L. REv. 751 (1962) (which appears to urge just this sort of action). Since
Davant and Reef, which were companion Fifth Circuit cases, appear to follow the Witherspoon
approach, one wonders if there might not be some connection. Texas is, of course, in the Fifth
Circuit.
Judge Craig, dissenting in Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262, 268 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1966) ("substantially all" is flexibly interpreted) does decry the
"judicial blessing to the abrogation, by a branch of the Executive Department, of the legislative process," id. at 271; but this dissent can be read as objecting to the extent of the interpretation rather than its nature.
141. "The transaction was shaped so as to make it essentially 'a device whereby it has
been attempted to withdraw corporate earnings at capital gains rates by distributing all the
assets of a corporation in complete liquidation and promptly reincorporating' them." 1961-2
C.B. 62, 64. See also supra note 107 and accompanying text.
142. Gregory v. Helvering, 393 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). See also supra note 34 (Hand's
famous quote in Helvering v. Gregory).
143. See supra note 110.
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As to the first reading, 44 insofar as Revenue Ruling 61-156 counts as a
functionally unrelated test application, it might simply be a sloppy attempt to
apply the "real" functionally unrelated test. If it could be shown objectively
that the sale of "new blood" stock was economically independent of the
corporate liquidation,'145 and that the withdrawal of cash from the old
corporation had economic effects distinct from those of the sale and transfer
of assets to the new corporation,146 then possibly the first Baztey argument
could be used, and the facts separated, without considering the taxpayer's
motive as a criterion. Independently classifiable steps can take place at the
same time. For example, if a new employment contract was entered into at the
time of the Davant transactions, it might be considered unrelated to other
events occuring simultaneously.
As to the second Bazley reading, while the specific taxpayer's motive in
this case might not be used in classifying the transactions, the probable motive
of most taxpayers in similar cases, and the practical effect of the statutory
interpretation might be considered. In part, such an inquiry could be cast, as
it was in Gregory, as an argument about congressional purposes: in light of the
47
effect, Congress did not intend this sort of transaction to escape tax.
The second argument against the functionally unrelated test is that it
may vest too much uncontrolled power in the trial court since the facts and
not the statute are interpreted.' 4s This argument seems weak. As a practical
144. See supra note 74.
145. It could also be argued that the legal relationships created by the sale of the old
corporation's assets to the new corporation, that is, the liquidation of the old corporation,
and the sale of stock to the new public shareholders, were separate and distinct. After the
sale of assets, the new corporation rather than the old owned them; after the liquidation and
'distribution, the old corporation's former shareholders stand in its shoes; and after the
public sale of shares of the new corporation, a new group of shareholders is created. Just
to state this alternate test is to perceive its analytical difficiencies, however. The bare legal
relationshiis created by one step in a step-transaction are nearly always separate from the
,relationships created by another step. For example, even in Davant and Reef it could be
argued that the sale to the strawmen created separate legal relationships. See supra note 20.
So even though Paul & Zimet's initial analysis is framed in terms of "legal" fruitfulness,
supra note 105, it seems clear that, if used at all, the test should be economic fruitfulness.
146. See Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966) (assets of Warehouse
sold to Water and Warehouse liquidated).
147. See Gregory v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
148. Factual findings "may not be upset if found by a jury unless the reviewing court
is convinced that reasonable men could only make contrary findings, or, if found by a
judge without a jury, unless clearly erroneous." Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287, 289
(4th Cir. 1962). See also Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 499 (1940); FE. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (trial by judge without a jury).
The initial Third Circuit opinion in Bazley spoke to this issue: "Whether an appropriate
integrated transaction shall be broken into several separate steps ... is frequently a necessary
determination of deciding tax consequences. Where no statute or regulation controls, the
Tax Court's selection of the course to follow is no more reviewable than any other question
of fact." 46-1 U.S. Tax Cas. II9135 (3d Cir.) withdrawn, 155 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1946).
The first two sentences are quotes from Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1940).
Cf. the substituted opinion, Bazley v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 237, 240 (3d Cir. 1946). See also
Survant v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1947) (step transactions doctrine used
to find "D" reorganization: "the finding of the Tax Court that the liquidation of the old

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV

matter appellate courts have rarely been reticent in reviewing the tax consequences of the basic facts found by trial courts in reincorporation cases. For
example, the Fourth Circuit in Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner,149 overturned the tax court's finding of an "F" reorganization because that the facts
showed too long a time between the liquidation and the reincorporation.15°
The third argument is that the functionally unrelated test is too powerful
a method of interpretation. As usual, Professor Bittker makes this argument
most persuasively:
A rogue offshoot of the substance-over-form doctrine suggests that when a
taxpayer selects one of several forms that have identical practical consequences in the real world, the government can disregard the chosen
form and tax the transaction as though the most costly of the alternatives has been employed. The implications of this theory are mindboggling . . . [P]ushed to a drily logical extreme, the recasting of
transactions to a court with the most costly practical equivalent would
not have to await an actual transaction between the related parties,
thus, a profitable corporation's accumulated earnings could be treated
as having been, in effect, (a) distributed to its shareholders (who, after
all, have complete control over the corporation's dividend policy) and
(b) returned by them to the corporation as a contribution to its
capital.'-51

This clearly overstates the case, for the same argument could be made
about other more traditional methods of tax interpretation. As long as it is
judiciously applied, the functionally unrelated test seems no more objectionable on the grounds that it is too powerful than the substance-over-form
doctrine1 52 Success in limiting these flexible methods of interpretation infers
equal likelihood of success in limiting the functionally unrelated test.
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE
REINCORPORATION PROBLEM

Not only must the functionally unrelated test overcome the three main
Company was but one step in an integrated transaction is a finding of fact and . . . is
therefore binding on this court."); Heller v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 376, 378 (9th Cir. 1945)
(quoting Dobson language). See generally Rice, When is a Liquidation Not a Liquidation
for Federal Income Tax Purposes?, 8 STAN. L. REV. 208, 219 (1956).

149. 345 F.2d 35, 41-42 (4th Cir. 1965) (no mention of the standard of review).
150. In addition to Pridemark, Reef Co. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125, 130 (5th Cir.
1966) ("F" reorganization found after holding that the redemption of old shareholders was
functionally unrelated) cited the "clearly erroneous" standard in upholding the Tax Court's
use of the step-transactions doctrine to disregard a sale to a strawman, but went on to
overturn the same court's finding that the redemption of old stockholders could not be
disregarded for purposes of determining whether there was an "F" reorganization.
151, Bittker, supra note 104, at 711-12.
152. Apparently, once the substance-over-form doctrine became accepted, the courts'
problem became one of drawing the line between cases when the doctrine would be applied
and those when it would not. Chirelstein, supra note 44, at 441-42. The line has still not been
precisely drawn, and courts still have to recognize that the doctrine is not a substitute for
analysis, see, e.g., Edwards v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 578 (10th Cir. 1969), but the injection
of the substance-over-form doctrine into the tax system has not caused the system to collapse.
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arguments directed specifically against it, it must also prove superior to other
possible judicial solutions in stopping the reincorporation device. 3 At least
five alternative solutions have been advanced. The first is to find the liquidation
of the old corporation is a sham. 5 4 The arguments against this judicial solution are, however, even more persuasive than those against the functionally
unrelated test. It would create a common law-type reorganization in addition
to the "F"-type reorganization, which would have conditions and consequences
even more confusing than those of the functionally unrelated test.- 55
153. See supra text accompanying notes 95-110.
154. B. BirrEr & J. Eusnc, supra note 3, at 113.20. The argument was made by the
Service in Jlerghash v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 743, 749 (1965), afJ'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1966) (50% new blood injected into successor corporation), and strongly argued by Judge
Pierce in part III of his dissent in Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144, 167 (1962) (28%
new blood injected into successor corporation). It has also been urged by some commentators,
see, e.g., Comment,

The Liquidation-Reincorporation Device-Analysis and Proposed

Solutions, 14 VsL. L. RF-v. 423, 458-61 (1969) (other commentators urging this solution are
cited therein at 458, n.199). A similar approach involving a different issue was allowed by
the Tax Court in Casco Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 32 (1967) (old and new
corporations were the same, and new could carry back operating losses).
The sham theory has a certain attraction; while the underlying relationships created by
state law generate tax consequences, see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962)
(wife's interest in dower is not the same as her interest would have been under community
property law), the federal tax system is not bound by the labels affixed to these underlying
relationships by state law, see Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938) (state definition of "inheritance" not controlling for purposes of I.R.C. § 102(a)). The sham theory would hold that
while in a particular case there may have been a documentary liquidation and dissolution
of the old corporation, and a reincorporation of the assets in a new corporation, nevertheless
for federal tax purposes no such liquidation and reincorporation would be deemed to have
taken place. The sham theory also has the virtue of avoiding I.R.C. § 331(b) (1976), which seems
to stand in the way of overriding liquidation treatment with I.R.C. § 301 (1976 & Supp. III
1979) directly.
155. There are two sorts of -problems with this sham theory. The first problem is statutory. Congress has very carefully defined the term "reorganization" in I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)
(1976), and the regulations make it clear these definitions must be precisely met. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.368-2(a) (1960) ("the term 'reorganization' is to be strictly limited to the specific transaction set forth in section 368(a)"). While it is possible that a set of paper transactions could
be so lacking in substance that one might argue the sham theory ought to apply, I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1)(F) (1976) seems to cover such a situation ("the term 'reorganization' means a mere
change in identity, form, or place of organization'). Further, one important use of the sham
theory is in solving the 80%-control problem, and the more broadly the theory is interpreted,
the more types of reorganizations (D, E, etc.) it might supplant. Of course it is possible to
apply a double standard, requiring the taxpayer to meet precisely the requirements of I.R.C.
§ 358(a)(1) (1976) definitions when he wants reorganization treatment, and applying the
common-law sham theory when he does not want reorganization treatment.
The second problem is practical, and parallels problems with the functionally unrelated
test. If the sham theory is adopted, how could one determine the conditions and consequences
of its use? There are few clear policy guidelines for courts to follow in attempting to determine these conditions and consequences, and without such guidelines, it is inevitable that
the "court-made law [will be] uncertain and frequently contradictory." 1954 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4066 (explaining in part, why the new reorganizations provisions were
adopted). This is exactly what Congress attempted to avoid in formulating the precise
definitions under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1). Id.
In large measure, these are problems common to all judicial action, but they are
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A second Code solution, suggested by several commentators, would be the
converse of the approach used by the tax court in Kimbell-Diamond Milling
Co. v. Commissioner.15 In Kimbell-Diamond, acquisition of stock was treated
as an acquisition of assets for some purposes. For use against the reincorporation device, the court would do the opposite, treating the acquisition of assets
as an acquisition of stock to which the more restrictive provisions of section
304 would apply. 15 7 While this would not be a perfect solution, it would
apparently eliminate the dividend-within-gain problem, and transform the
80%-control test into a 50%-control test, which is in harmony with the
equivalent redemption provisions of section 302.'5 A third Code solution,
suggested by Reef v. Commissioner59 would be to use the second Bazley approach to impose section 302 rather than section 301 treatment. 160 Neither of
these solutions seems promising.1' 6
exacerbated with the sham theory because the conditions and consequences of its application
is even less certain than the functionally unrelated test. At least the functionally unrelated
test appears to operate within the statutory framework; there is a juggling of statutes, to be
sure, but when gerrymandered, the statutory category is applied and the consequences determined. This is so with the sham theory only when it is not needed: that is, when the "'F"
reorganization is available.
156. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
827 (1951).
157. See, e.g., Wood, A Proposed Treatment of Reincorporation Transactions, 25 TAX L.
REv. 282, 286 (1970). See also B. BiTrKEr & J, EusricE, supra note 3, at ff 14.54(2); Nicholson,
supra note 14, at A-21.
158. See infra note 161.
159. 368 F.2d 125, 134 (5th Cir. 1966) (that portion of the transaction characterized as a
"redemption" is functionally unrelated to the "F" reorganization).
160. While the special facts in Reef, id., make it a candidate for the first reading of
Bazley, that is, as a separate transaction on quasi-factual grounds, a more general use of this
approach would entail the second reading of the case, as a simple substitution of categories
when necessary. The approach is further discussed infra at note 161.
161. Consistency is the general principle which Kimbell-Diamond expresses. If one
corporation acquires another's assets, it receives a cost basis for those assets. I.R.C. § 334(b)(1)
(1976). But if it acquires the other's stock, intending to acquire the assets by immediate
liquidation, a literal application of I.R.C. § 334(b)(1) would give it a carry-over basis for the
assets from the other corporation. This creates an "unjustified dichotomy between the two
otherwise similar methods . . .", B. BiTTER & J. EUSTIE, supra note 3, at 1 11.44(1), which the
Kimbell-Diamond case rectifies, treating the acquisition of the other's stock as the acquisition
of the other's assets. See also I.R.C. § 334(b)(3) (1976) (which partially codifies KimbellDiamond).
The same sort of problem is presented by the contrast between liquidation-reincorporation
under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (1976) and stock acquisition under I.R.C. § 304 (1976). This contrasting treatment of the 80%-control and dividend-within-gain problems is best explained by
hypotheticals modeled on Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962) (sale to corporation
owned 72% by old shareholders); Berghash v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), af'd, 361
F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966) (sale to corporation owned 50-50 with employee); and Davant v.
Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966) (liquidation-reincorporation with transferee
corporation having $800,000 retained earnings, and the transferor having $200,000).
As to the 80%-control problem, in a Gallagher-type situation, assume that corporation
X's stock is owned 50-50 by A and B, and that corporation Y's stock is owned by A and C.
Assume further that A and B sell corporation X's operating assets to corporation Y and
liquidate corporation X. Section 368(a)(1)(D) will not apply since A does not own 80% of
corporation Y, Gallagher, and A will win the benefits of the reincorporation device. That is,
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he will get capital treatment on the liquidation of corporation X, corporation Y will receive
a cost basis for the assets it purchased from corporation X, and so forth.
On the other hand, if A and B had sold their stock to corporation Y, the results would
be different. Since A owns 50 percent of corporation Y, I.R.C. § 304(c)(1) (1976) provides
that the amount paid by corporation Y to A is treated as a dividend in redemption under
I.R.C. § 302 (1976). (And his X stock is treated as a contribution to Y's capital. See I.R.C.
§ 118 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) and related sections.) A's ownership in corporation X will be
tested as a redemption under IR.C. § 302(b)(2)(C). He owned 50% before the sale, and 50%
after the sale (by virtue of the attribution rules of I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(C), made applicable by
I.R.C. § 304(c)(2)). This is not enough to cause the distribution to be "substantially disproportionate," and Y's distribution to A will be treated as ordinary income to the extent of
corporation Y's earnings and profits. It will not be limited by A's gain on the sale. (An equivalent analysis in the Berghash-type setting where D, 100% owner of corporation T, sells his
stock to corporation V, of which he is a 50% owner, reveals that the capital treatment of
I.R.C. §§ 868(a)(1)(D) and 304 are the same.)
Section 304 only deals with the treatment of the seller of the stock; the other benefits of
the reincorporation device must be separately analyzed. For example, in both the Gallagher
and Berglhash-type situations modeled above, if corporation Y and V then liquidated their
subsidiary, presumably they would take the assets with the stepped-up basis under I.R.C.
§ 334(b)(2). Thus, if the Kimbrell Diamond approach were applied to the Gallaghersituation,
the results would be different from a "D" reorganization. One of the reincorporation benefits
would be denied, capital treatment for the sale of stock, but another would be allowed, a
stepped-up basis for the acquired assets.
As to the dividend-within-gain problem, I.R.C. § 304's approach is radically different
from that of I.R.C. § 356(a)(3). Section 304(b)(2)(A) looks to the earnings and profits of the
acquiring corporation, but § 356(a)(2) looks to those of the distributing company. Thus, in
Davant, where Warehouse (with retained earnings of approximately $200,000) was liquidated
and its assets distributed to Water (retained earnings of approximately $800,000), the literal
reading of I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) limits the ordinary income treatment to the earnings of Warehouse; but if the transaction were treated as a sale of Warehouse's stock to Water, ordinary
income treatment would be limited to the earnings of Water. (Presumably, if the shareholders knew that the transaction would be treated in this fashion, they would have
liquidated Water into Warehouse, rather than the other way around.)
The suggestion of two commentators that this sort of reverse Kimbell-Diamond approach
could be used to apply I.R.C. § 304 to the liqudiation-reincorporation case has merit. See,
B. BiTrR & J. EusTicm, supra note 3, at 1f 14.54(2); Wood, supra note 148, at 286. It would
handle most of the 80%-control problem, since § 304 applies with 50% common control, and
even though this may not result in ordinary income treatment, the results are treated
consistently with those of redemption under I.R.C. § 302. Cf. Reef Co. v. Commissioner, 368
F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966) (suggestion of 50% limit for functionally unrelated test). Among
other things, and unlike the reorganization provisions, this allows different shareholders to be
treated differently. In the above Gallagher-type hypothetical (A & B, equal owners of X,
sell stock to Y, owned equally by A & C), B will meet the requirement of I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(B)
and will receive capital treatment on his sale even though A does not. Perhaps more importantly, it allows the I.R.C. § 318 attribution rules to apply. Also the dividend treatment
is not limited by gain. While it does not adequately solve the dividend-within-gain problem,
it is precise. Once applied, the parties know what the consequences of its application are.
There are two central objections to this approach, however. First, the conditions of application would not be known. It might be argued that I.R.C. § 304 should apply in all cases,
but if all asset acquisitions were treated as stock acquisitions, then I.R.C. § 304 might apply
in a bona fide "D" reorganization case. And if I.R.C. § 304 is only selectively applied, again,
the conditions of application would not be known. In response it might be argued that
instead of I.R.C. § 331 (and related sections) being displaced by the "D" reorganization provisions as under the reincorporation cases, a three-level hierarchy might be created, with
I.R.C. § 331 giving way to I.R.C. § 304, which in turn would give way to I.R.C. § 368(a)(IXD).
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This would mean that only one section would be applied at a time. Certainty would be
achieved, but the consequences would be rather bizzare. At 49%, the shareholder might receive
liquidation treatment, from 51% to 79% his ordinary income would be limited to the retained earnings of the transferee corporation (e.g., Water at $800,000), and above 79% would
be limited to the retained earnings of the transferee corporation ($200,000). The attribution
rules of I.R.C. § 318 would apply below 80%, but not above 79%. Again, it might be
argued that by extending Ringwalt (attribution-type rules applied in "D" reorganization case)
and Davant (earnings of both corporations used) the inconsistencies could be smoothed out.
But this sort of analysis leads to the second, fatal, objection. This sort of amendment is a
job for Congress, not case-by-case analysis. Perhaps for this reason, courts have been traditionally reluctant, except in the rather special Kimbell-Diamond situation, to impose the
reasoning of one sort of acquisition, asset or stock, where the other actually took place. See,
e.g., Trianon Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 156 (1958), acq. 1959-1 C.B. 5 (stock-acquisition not treated as an asset-acquisition).
Finally, by comparison with the functionally unrelated test, the statutory effects of this
sort of analysis seem too complicated. "Another approach, which has not yet been developed
in the case, would be to analyze the liquidation-reincorporation from the perspective of
section 302 stock redemptions. The two types of transactions have important structural similarities. In both situations the shareholder receives cash and at the same time has a change in
his proportionate ownership in the corporation which continues the business enterprise.
Under this analysis, if the entire transaction, viewed as a redemption, would not have met
the tests of section 302 for capital gains treatment, a dividend would result." S. SumRRY, W.
WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AUiL-, supra note 96, at 925.
While it might not seem so at first blush, this approach is really a sort of amalgamation
of the sham and I.R.C. § 304 approaches discussed supra in text accompanying notes 154-157.
There are two main types of reincorporation transactions: straight liquidation followed by a
reincorporation; and sale to a new corporation followed by liquidation of the old. Id. Both
raise the same 80%-control and dividend-within-gain problems.
The I.R.C. § 302 approach is similar to the sham corporation approach in that the new
corporation should probably be viewed as a continuation of the old. Otherwise, if only the
old corporation is used, the test of I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(C) is senseless. Cf. I.R.C. § 304(b)(1);
Sinsberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978) (stockholders of old and new corporations combined for purposes of I.R.C. § 356(a)(1)). In both types of reincorporation, the old
corporation is liquidated. Presumably, one of the problems is determining percentages of
stock ownership when the old and new corporations are owned by different people in
different proportions. The I.R.C. § 302 maneuver is similar to the I.R.C. § 304 in that its
purpose is to run the transaction through the sophisticated distribution rules of I.R.C. § 302,
including the attribution rules of I.R.C. § 302(c). This has the advantage over the I.R.C. § 304
analysis in that an asset transaction does not have to be viewed artificially as a stock transaction. It has an advantage over a straight Bazley-301 analysis in the sophistication of the
distribution rules of § 302.
Moreover, two cases appear to take this sort of approach. Casco Prod. Co. v. Commissioner,
48 T.C. 32 (1967) (9% old stockholders were redeemed out in a merger and the old and
new corporations were viewed as the same), and Reef Co. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th
Cir. 1966) (the buy-out of a 49% group was viewed as a redemption and a functionally unrelated "F" reorganization). The concept was rejected however in Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144, 158 (1962) (the Service contended that the liquidation of old corporation should be ignored and the transactions tested as a redemption), but the court did not,
or would not, focus clearly on the issue. It read Bazley as simply denying the taxpayer the
benefits of the reorganization provisions, without examining the possibility that Bazley
could be read consistently with Reef, as viewing the "redemption" separate from the reorganization, or consistently with Davant, as simply switching categories when appropriate. Id.
Like I.R.C. § 304, the I.R.C. § 302 approach only deals with the treatment of the excess
cash withdrawn from corporate solution; it does not directly deal with the other benefits of
the reincorporation device. For example, it does not deal with the stepped-up basis issue. Pre-
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The fourth solution is strongly implied by Telephone Answering Service
Co. (TASCO) v. Commissioner. 62 In an unbroken line of cases since the
early sixties, the tax court had held the only way to deny shareholders reincorporation benefits was to displace the liquidation provisions with the reorganization provisions. 163 Another approach was developing using a Gregorytype rationale to deny some liquidation benefits when the transaction is outside the purpose for which the liquidation provisions were enacted. 164 In
TASCO, Judge Tannenwald used this approach to deny the benefits of
section 337 to the corporation. Although this was not equivalent to denying
the liquidation benefits of section 331 to shareholders, 65 at least one of the
liquidation provisions had been breached without finding reorganization to
displace it. While this approach, denying the corporation the capital gains
benefit of the reincorporation device, seems more in step with the traditional
Gregory rationale than the functionally unrelated test and its family of cases
forcing the taxpayer into an unwanted "D" reorganization, uncertainty is its
drawback. Like the "sham" corporation approach, essentially courts are attempting to assemble a new category without clear borders. The full implications of the approach remain to be explored, but initially the approach has
most of the drawbacks of the functionally unrelated test. 68
sumably, if the reincorporation is viewed as a sham, there is no effect. Or the reincorporation
might be viewed as a sham for purposes of distribution of cash, but not for purposes of the
basis of the operating assets. Cf. General Housewares v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.
1980) (I.R.C. § 337 and reorganization can both be found in the same transaction).
Again, the major objection is the complexity of the statutory amendments required, and
the unsuitability of the court process for this sort of amendment. On the other hand, as in
Reef, this § 302 approach need not be viewed as an alternative to the functionally unrelated
test, but as a supplement to it. Once the transactions have passed the functionally unrelated
test, I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(C) might be applied, except that I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(C) would only apply
to the stockholders of the old corporation and the test would become meaningless.
162. 63 T.C. 423 (1974), affd (in unpublished per curiam opinion, 546 F.2d 423), 39
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1 77-438 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977)).
163. The-basic decision was made in Gallagher, 39 T.C. at 160 (1962). See Commissioner
v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1966);. TASCO, 63 T.C. at 437-39 (Judge Sterrett's
dissent). See also Nicholson, supra note 14, at A-33 to A-34.
164. Davant took this route. 366 F.2d at 882 (5th Cir. 1966) ("Clearly this liquidation
cannot come within the intention of Congress in enacting the complete liquidation provisions.
Those provisions contemplate that operating assets will no longer be used by the stockholders
to carry on the business as a corporation").
-Also following this approach was Judge Tannenwald of the Tax Court,- dissenting in
Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner; 54 T.C. 420, 447 (bailout was part of decedents estate
plan). Judge Tannenwald suggested that the legislative history of I.R.C.- § 331 demonstrated
that prior to 1924 the liquidating provisions, would subject dividends to ordinary tax (not
capital gains), and that Congress only allowed "capital exchange" treatment because "it felt
a significant transmutation occurred in the shareholder's interest." Id. at 449. However, Judge
Tantenwald failed to carry forward this argument to the conclusion that if- § 331 did not
apply, the gain would have, been ordinary income, for among other things, he might have
bad to extend the denial-of-benefits argument to the backup § 1036 analysis as well. Instead,
he redirected the argument along the lines of the "sham" thebry of the dissent in Gallagher,
and would have held there was a "common' law" reorganization.
, 165. 63 T.C:at 432-33, n.4. Cf. Genecov v. United States,412 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1969)
(there can be a complete liquidation even if the business is-continued by the new corporation).
166. .Presumably, the consequences of using this line of analysis are as follows. The main
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Finally, a fifth partial Code solution, suggested in later cases,' 67 would be
benefits of the reincorporation device are: converting ordinary income into capital gain,
generating a deductible loss, and stepping up artificially the basis of operating assets. See
supra note 11.
As to the first benefit, converting ordinary income into capital gains, Judge Tannenwald's
analysis in his dissent to Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. at 449 (1970) (estate
liquidation pursuant to testator's will, reincorporation by beneficiaries) seems sound.
"Amounts received on liquidations are treated as the proceeds of an 'exchange' only because
section 331 says they should be. Indeed, in the early years of the income tax, liquidating
distributions were treated as dividends subject to ordinary tax and not as capital gains ...
Congress analogized a liquidation to a sale or exchange because it felt that a significant
transmutation occurred in the shareholder's interest. . . . Where a corporation is liquidated
and its business continued in noncorporate form, there is validity to that analogy. And
where the business of the new corporation differs substantially from that of the old, the
Similarly, the analogy remains where there is a significant change
analogy is equally valid ....
of ownership, although it can become strained where there is a continuity of ownership, albeit
somewhat reduced, on the part of a shareholder who retains some of the assets. . . . But
where a formal liquidation is followed instanter by a prearranged reincorporation of the
very same business with the very same owners, the analogy fails completely. See Davant v.
Commissioner, 366 F.2d at 882. Compare also the contrasting of 'genuine liquidation' with
'going concern' in United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. at 454-55." Id. See
also Massell v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 398 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
The consequences of denying the benefits would be that individual shareholders would
be not receive the capital gains deduction under I.R.C. § 1202 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Cf.
Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (denial of capital gains treatment).
.Presumably, all of the old company's shareholders need not be treated the same. Capital
gains treatment might be denied only those who were continuing as shareholders of the new
corporation; the old shareholders might not be affected. Such a treatment is similar to that
of I.R.C. § 302, but is more in accordance with the theory developed in prior cases. See supra
note 97.
Like the other judicial adjusters discussed in this part, the major drawbacks are determining when I.R.C. § 331 is to be denied: that is, the conditions of the concept's application
and the consequences of its application. See TASCO, 63 T.C. at 438 (Judge Sterrett dissenting). Cf. Note, supra note 138. Another problem is overcoming I.R.C. § 331(b) which provides
that I.R.C. § 301 is not to apply to partial or complete liquidations. Although this could be
handled in the same way the original problem is handled: denying that there is a "complete
liquidation" for these purposes.
The second main benefit of reincorporation is generating a deductible loss where the
value of the stock was declined. Here again, the existence of a "complete liquidation"
might be denied, but with uncertain results. The same problem reappears in denial of the
third benefit, stepped-up basis for the operating assets. Although perhaps this problem
need not be solved; the price for this stepped-up basis would be payment of ordinary gain
on the transaction. It reappears again as another benefit, wiping out the earnings and profits
account of the old corporation. To be consistent, the account should be attached to the new
corporation, but here it is especially hard to see how the denial approach would work.
On the whole then, the TASCO approach seems most effective in denying the shareholder
capital gain treatment. The other problems it raises speak for a return to the Gallagher approach: the liquidation provisions may only be displaced by other coherent systems, such as
the reorganization provisions, and not used to selectively deny benefits on the grounds of
purpose. Perhaps this is why the approach was consistently rejected prior to TASCO. See
Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1966); Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. at
158 (1962).
167. See, e.g., Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860, 868 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 836 (1980) (suggested as an alternative to "rewriting" I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (1976)); Davant
v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 889-90 (5th Cir. 1966) (as an alternate way of handling part
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to invoke the considerable power of section 482 to allocate income between
the old and new corporations. 16 8 This might partially solve the dividend-withingain problem, but again there would necessarily be some uncertainty. While
these approaches might be superior if courts were starting fresh, use of the
functionally unrelated test, or more precisely the Bazley-section 301 solution
to the dividend-within-gain problem, may be preferable. It is, at least, a
known danger to the reincorporation device.
CONCLUSION

Nearly everyone would agree the reincorporation device should be stopped,
but determining whether flexible judicial interpretation should be used to
stop it is a closer question. The long practice of stretching of the statute to
impose a "D" reorganization indicates some acceptance of weakened self-assessment system in this area. The results do not seem too disastrous. This sort
of flexibility in the reincorporation area has shown no great propensity to
migrate. But Davant and Reef have turned to the functionally unrelated test
as a way of "interpreting" the facts instead of the statue. If the preceding
analysis is correct the functionally unrelated test as used by Davant and Reef
simply disguises a sort of Bazley sleight of hand. Under all the smoke and
bright lights, the courts are extending Gregory and Minnesota Tea by switching the transaction into what they consider a more appropriate category. The
potential benefit of this category-switching, stopping the reincorporation device,
is relatively apparent. But the functionally unrelated test were generally
adopted, taxpayers would be less confident relying upon the Code's plain
language, even if a tax category seems both appropriate and independently
supported by economic reality. This price is too high. Perhaps there are
circumstances that would justify category-switching on the scale envisaged by
Revenue Ruling 61-156, Davant and Reef, but stopping the reincorporation
device is not one of them. Admittedly, the provocation seems great, and
Congress appears to have authorized some sort of judicial action. But, in light
of the dividend-within-gain problem). I.R.C. § 482 (1976) is only a partial solution, for it

would not provide a bulwark against many of the other benefits of the reincorporation
device, but may provide useful material with which to construct a partial solution. See infra
note 168.
168. I.R.C. § 482 (1976) allows the Secretary of the Treasury to allocate certain tax attributes between tvo or more organizations. Its main use in the reincorporation area is in
solving part of the dividend-within-gain problem by allocating some of the earnings and
profits of the transferee corporation to the transferor so as to overcome this portion of the
limitation. See Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966) (I.R.C. § 482 used to
overcome the earnings and profits limitations). The technique was also mentioned in Atlas
Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860, 868 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980) (fairly
standard reincorporation case; "D" imposed), as a reason for rejecting Davant's approach
that "the" corporation in I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) refers to both corporations, so as to allow the
earnings and profits of both to be used to measure the ordinary income character of the
distribution. The courts were only focusing on the possibility that the assets might be given
an inflated value, however, not the case where the old corporation's assets are sold to the
new for true, but appreciated, value. Cf. American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204,
215-16 (1970) (rejecting the approach that earnings should in effect be transferred when
the assets are sold at fair market value).
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of the uncertain nature of this authorization and the drawbacks of the
functionally unrelated test as a method of effectuating it, the proponents of
the test have failed to carry their burden. Most importantly, they have not
demonstrated that this approach is necessary when other solutions are available and seem preferable.1 6 9 Chief among them is a Code amendment, which
169. From time-to-time various legislative solutions have been proposed. These solutions
have not yet been adopted, perhaps because of the complexity of the task; a reincorporation
section would have to specify both the conditions, and the consequences, of the section's application. As to the conditions, a good reincorporation section would have to specify:
(a) the requisite continuity of interest, both
(i) at the corperate level, including distinguishing between
(A) business assets kept in corporate solution, and
(B) the business itself, and
(ii) at the shareholder level, including distinguishing between
(A) the absolute
(1) injection, or
(2) withdrawal of new shareholders, and
(B) the relative ownership interests between the shareholders, and
(b) the time and extent of any interruption in the continuity of interest at any level, and
(c) the importance of the shareholder's motive for engaging in the transaction.
As to the tax consequences of such as action, the section would have to specify capital
gain treatment with respect to both corporations and shareholders, recognition of gain or
loss to both, corresponding adjustment to basis (shares and operating assets) to both, and so
forth. See Wood, supra note 157.
Relevant legislation was studied, proposed, or introduced in the years 1954, 1958, 1964, 1976
and 1979. In 1954 a Code section was passed by the House but deleted by the Senate. Its main
virtue was that it proposed a new section to stop the reincorporation device; its most glaring
defect was that it only applied to the simplest version of the device, liquidation-followed-byreincorporation, not the more common modern version.
The 1958 Subchapter C Advisory Group proposal, H.R. REP. No. 4459, 86th Cong., Ist Sess.
§§ 21, 26 (1959), remedied this latter defect. It applied to all forms of reincorporations. And
the scope of "D" reorganization was expanded, since the required § 368(c) control was
reduced to 50%, but was otherwise a step backward from 1954 because it attempted to deal
with the reincorporation problem through the "D" reorganization provisions, thereby perpetrating the schizophrenic use of that section for two quite different congressional purposes,
assisting some shareholders who wish to avoid gain in appropriate circumstances, and keeping
other shareholders from using the reincorporation bailout device. See S. SusutY, W. WARREN,
P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 95, at 925.
In 1976, there was a movement toward full integration of the corporate tax. By causing
corporations to be generally taxed as partnerships, such an integration would have
eliminated the underlying bailout pressures created by the basic postulates of corporate
taxation. The movement metamorphized into one calling for partial integration, which
would still have eliminated much of the bailout pressure, and then into a movement to
reduce the capital gains tax, which passed, thereby increasing rather than reducing the reincorporation device's attractiveness. See Surrey, supra note 123.
In 1979, the goal of eliminating the underlying pressures which cause bailout behavior
rather than papering over their effects led to an innovative American Law Institute proposal.
At the shareholder level, the proposal was to eliminate bailout pressures by imposing an excise
tax on such favored distributions as liquidations, interest payments, salaries, and so forth. The
idea was to raise the overall tax on these favored distributions up to those imposed on § 301
dividends. FEDERAL INCOME TAX PRojEcm 33 (A.L.I. Tent. Draft No. 2 1979).
A related proposal was also innovative at the corporate level. Recognizing that most corporate sales or reorganizations provide the effective choice as to whether the operating assets
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could easily solve at least the dividend-within-gain problem. Cases such as
1
represent the correct approach in
Breech170 and American Manufacturingu
this area. The functionally unrelated test as expressed in Revenue Ruling 61156,172 Davant,273 Reef,174 and others 76 is an unwise expression of tax policy
and should be quietly abandoned.
will receive a carry-over or stepped-up basis, this related proposal simply allows a corporation
to elect which treatment it prefers. Federal Income Tax Project 15 (A.L.I. Tent. Draft No.
1 1977). For similar conclusions in the "B" reorganization area, see Steines, Policy ConsideraLions in the Taxation of B Reorganizations, 31 HAsr. L.J. 993, 1016 (1980).
170. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
172. See supranotes 72-88 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes. 83-85 and accompanying text.
175. See Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144, 165 (1965) (Judge Pierce dissenting).
See also American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 204, 233-34 (1970) (Judge Sterrett
dissenting); Note, New Answers to the Liquidation-ReincorporationProblem, 76 COLuM. L.
REv.268, 294-96 (1976).
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